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Abstract
The history of private philanthropy in the US has been dominated by family foundations with
arms-length philanthropy practices that largely existed in separation from commercial
enterprise and business operations. This paper looks at emerging organizational and funding
models being used in a wide range of disease areas in which philanthropy has shifted towards a
more "venture-oriented" model sometimes referred to as disease foundation venture
philanthropy (DFVP) as practiced by disease focused foundations (DFFs). More specifically, this
research seeks to understand how these models map onto the range of translational challenges
confronted by those engaged in bringing ideas from the bench to the bedside and it explores
our current understanding of DFVP best practices. It concludes by raising questions and
addressing issues designed to assist those who seek to setup successful collaborations between
DFFs and industry partners.
Background
Traditional Disease-Focused Philanthropy
The US has a long history of non-profit foundations active in biomedical research.3 Family
foundations have long dominated the philanthropy industry, and their outsized influence exists
to this day in well-known institutions such as the Carnegie Institution, Rockefeller Foundation,
Howard Hughes Foundation and more recently, the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation of $25B
endowment fame.3 Historically, these foundations have had little or no general public input,
controlled decision-making within a private context, and devoted themselves to arms-length
grants funding activities in a somewhat noblesse oblige manner. Philanthropy was treated as
and thought to be separate and distinct from commercial activities and business.
The Carnegie Institution for Science was one of the first major philanthropy players who focused
on funding disease research. Founded in 1902 in Washington DC with $10M from the famed
industrialist, Andrew Carnegie, the Carnegie Institution was intended to be an "independent
research institution" devoted to expanding basic scientific knowledge. Grants were initially given
to mostly non-medical studies (e.g. anthropology, economics, mathematics, etc). Over its 100
year history, the Carnegie Institution has expanded its research areas to medical-related studies
the most well-known grants focusing on developmental biology and embryology. From its
inception, the Carnegie Institution has sought to support "exceptional individuals" in their quest
to solve "intriguing scientific questions." Carnegie scientists and researchers include luminaries
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such as Alfred Hershey, who won the Nobel Prize in 1969 for his insights into virus replication
and genetic structure, and Andrew Fire, who won the Nobel Prize in 2006 for discovery of RNA
interference. 5
The Rockefeller Foundation has similarly had a broad range of interests with its mission to
"promote the well-being of humanity." Founded in 1913 by the New York State Legislature and
endowed with the initial gift of $35M from John D. Rockefeller Sr., the Rockefeller Foundation
has distributed over $14B in current dollars from its inception onward. In sharp contrast to the
more hands on approach of philanthropist such as Bill Gates, John D. Rockefeller Sr. never
attended any of the board meetings, claiming he had no knowledge of how best to carry out the
mission of his eponymous philanthropy. Nevertheless, global and public health became an early
priority for the Rockefeller Foundation with its focus on hookworm eradication, malaria, yellow
fever, and schistosomiasis. Grants to medical and public health schools around the world also
supported the education prong of its mission. Illustrious accomplishments, especially in the
public health sector, span the entire history of the Rockefeller Foundation, starting with the
development of the yellow fever vaccine for clinical use by the Max Theiler in the Foundation's
Virus Laboratory the 1930's. (He eventually went on to receive the Nobel Prize in 1950.) The
Foundation supported the development of the electron microscope in the 1940's, the field of
genetics in the 1950's, an "international network" of scientists devoted to the "great neglected
diseases" of the developing world known as the Great Neglected Disease Program in the 1970's,
a tropical disease research program in cooperation with the WHO in the 1980's, and the
Children's Vaccine Initiative and the International AIDS Vaccine Initiative in the 1990's.46
The Albert and Mary Lasker Foundation was created in 1942 from fortunes from the advertising
world to "support biomedical research" to conquer disease, improve human health, and extend
life. Mary Lasker was a prominent and influential biomedical activist and helped to pass a bill to
create the now National Health, Lung, and Blood Institute in 1948. The Lasker Foundation also
lobbied for the passage of the National Cancer Act in 1971. According to the Lasker Foundation
website, the Lasker Award is given annually to a researcher, scientist, or clinician who has made
significant contributions towards the "understanding, diagnosis, treatment, cure, or prevention
of human disease." Seventy-six Lasker Award recipients have gone on to receive Nobel Prizes, so
a Lasker prize augurs well for the awardees. Discoveries that have been awarded include the
discovery of anti-TNF therapy for autoimmune diseases by Marc Feldmann and Ravinder N.
Page 6 of 71
Maini, discovery of nuclear hormone receptors by Pierre Chambon, Ronald M. Evans, Elwood V.
Jensen, the discovery of telomerase by Elizabeth Blackburn, Carol Greider, Jack Szotsak, and
more. The Lasker Foundation is not a grant-making foundation, instead, it primarily uses prizes
and awards as the means to highlight clinical science, basic science, and public service
accomplishments.47
The John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation was created in 1975 by John MacArthur,
one of the three wealthiest Americans at the time of his death. It is one of the 20 largest private
philanthropic organizations in the US with a $1.8B endowment in 2008, and has awarded more
than $4B over its lifetime. Its four main programs focus on global security and sustainability
including human rights, human and community development, general program including public
interest media, and the most famous, the MacArthur Fellows Program. The MacArthur Fellows
Program, also known as the MacArthur "genius" award, grants 5-year unrestricted fellowships
to 20-40 "individuals...who show exceptional merit and promise of continued creative work" per
year.48
The March of Dimes Foundation was founded in 1938 as the National Foundation for Infantile
Paralysis devoted to "decreasing [baby] birth defects, premature deaths, and infant mortality".
Originally conceived to fight polio, the March of Dimes Foundation supports research,
community services, education, and advocacy, according to its website. The Foundation was
founded by President Franklin D. Roosevelt, himself a polio victim, and was instrumental in
funding Dr. Virginia Apgar, who developed the now universal Apgar system for evaluating
newborn babies and legitimized a fledging specialty focused on newborns. In addition, the
March of Dimes funded Dr. Jonas Salk's and Dr. Albert Abin's research into polio vaccines, and
ran successful pilot tests with 1.83M US schoolchildren amidst significant public debate. After it
achieved its mission of developing a polio vaccine, the March of Dimes Foundation shifted its
efforts towards preventing premature deaths, defects, and decreasing infant mortality.49
Professionalization of Philanthropists & Patients
In the past few decades, the convergence of two trends has given rise to "venture philanthropy"
in the biomedical space as a popular philanthropic operations philosophy. These two trends are
the professionalization of the philanthropy industry, and the rising levels of patient education
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and engagement. The commercialization of philanthropic practices has been reflected in more
business-savvy backgrounds of recent foundation staff hires and adoption of performance
metrics scorecards to measure success.
A perusal of the backgrounds of program directors 50, even 20 years ago would found few
MBAs." The training of program directors of today's philanthropies are, by and large, rooted in
both academia and industry. In addition, venture philanthropy conferences such as those run by
FasterCures bring together disease focused foundations in a systematic way to run seminars,
present case studies, and network amongst themselves. Graduate degree programs like the
Master of Arts in Philanthropic Studies at Indiana University's Center on Philanthropy offer
specific coursework in philanthropy. The Association of Fundraising Professionals and the
Association of Healthcare Philanthropy offers seminars and certificate courses in venture
philanthropy for its members. Cultural sociologists like Michael Moody at the University of
Southern California have studied the construction and evolution of the venture philanthropy
culture, further institutionalizing the venture philanthropy field.'
Another sign of the maturation of the venture philanthropy industry is the rise of the venture
philanthropy ecosystem. New advisory organizations, consulting groups (e.g. Center for
Effective Philanthropy, Brigdespan), research firms (e.g. New Philanthropy Capital), and even
philanthropic investment banks (e.g. Sea Chang Capital) have been coming into existence.
FasterCures, a think tank devoted to transformative medical research enterprise, has even
called for "medical research investment analysts" who would provide the same rigor of analysis
into DFFs and their partners as Wall Street analysts.4'
Watch-dog organizations like Charity Navigator publish free annual quantitative scorecards of
the 5,000 largest US-based charities. It utilizes publically-available tax returns to evaluate
organizational efficiency and capacity. Charity Navigator breaks down expenses in program,
administrative, and fundraising expenses in both percentages and absolute figures, and lists
compensation figures for top leadership of the organization. American Institute of Philanthropy
(AIP) is a similar organization that publishes the "Charity Rating Guide & Watchdog Report" with
financial ratings on over 500 US charities.
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On the clinical front, patient advocacy groups armed with online forums (such as those found on
Patientslikeme.com) and access to unprecedented clinical and scientific information have
pointedly criticized the lack of real results in the form of disease-modifying therapies
commercialized from foundation-funded research.3 Many disease foundations that subscribe to
venture philanthropy were founded by patients and affected families who were "frustrated by
the slow pace of the traditional medical system." 41
The intense activism of the AIDS community, and its unprecedented engagement of basic
scientists and researchers to develop diagnostics and treatments, paved the way for today's
high-touch patient advocacy approach. When AIDS and HIV was first discovered in 1980 and
1983 respectively, the AIDS activist community mobilized in high-prevalence cities (e.g. San
Francisco, Paris) to engage local public health officials and federal regulators. These activists
were sophisticated, highly-educated, media savvy individuals who used a variety of public
awareness techniques (e.g. demonstrations, marches, sit-ins, lawsuits) to demand money,
resources, and information. They strategically aligned themselves with scientists to educate
themselves about the fledging AIDS science and push for better diagnostic and treatment
options. 14
Because of these scientifically-informed public advocacy activities, the FDA and NIH amended
their policies to expand access to drugs in development, include AIDS and HIV-infected patients
on protocol, research, and peer review committees and data safety monitoring boards. Crucially,
the FDA was persuaded to adopt surrogate markers for HIV drugs that decreased development
time for pharmaceutical companies, making it financially attractive for companies to increase
R&D spend in this area. As a result, the New England Journal of Medicine reported that AIDS-
related deaths had decreased by 67% in the US by 1998.14
Venture Philanthropy
Venture philanthropy is broadly described as applying for-profit business practices to non-profit
operations. " 7A key assumption that undergirds much of venture philanthropy is that fulfilling
the philanthropic mission and creating value for "investors" (venture philanthropy-speak for
donors and patients) are not mutually exclusive concepts.5 One of the earliest explications of
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venture philanthropy is found in a seminal April 1997 Harvard Business Review article "Virtuous
Capital: What Foundations Can Learn from Venture Capitalists". In this article, Christine W. Letts,
William Ryan, and Allen Grossman delineate the most relevant venture capitalist practices as
applied to foundation funding models. They tackle six areas in particular: risk management,
performance measures, closeness of the relationship, amount of funding, length of the
relationship, and finally, the exit. 2 Peter Frumkin in 2003 penned "Inside Venture Philanthropy",
one of the first broad look at the origin of venture philanthropy and the push by entrepreneurs
to adopt business practices to solve problems in "traditional philanthropy."I In the press, the
first usage of "venture philanthropy" was in the 1972 New York Times article about the
Rockefeller Family Foundation. A search for the term "venture philanthropy" in the global press
and other publications finds the number of hits increasing from 4 in 1998 to 105 in 2002 to 294
in 2009 for a CAGR of 8% from 2004 to 2009.
Much has been written about venture philanthropy in the past 10-20 years, including common
characteristics found in most venture philanthropy models. Often described as "collaborative,
mission-drive, strategic in their allocation of resources, and results-oriented" 1 , this new breed
of philanthropy was pioneered by entrepreneurs and newly-minted philanthropists. New wealth
holders pointed to the seeming lack of effectiveness and impact of organized philanthropy.
Meaningful advances in many of the areas that organizations targeted such as public health,
health care, and public education seemed sparse and scattered. The rise of venture philanthropy
shadowed the dot-com boom in the 1990's with good reason; the founders of successful
ventures relied heavily on venture capital practices to grow and be competitive. To this new
breed of philanthropists, current grant-making processes seemed slow, unfocused, and lacking
in clear performance measurement tools.'The application of their successful business strategies
to non-commercial interests seemed logical, and the fantastic wealth creation during this period
helped drive early proponents of venture philanthropy especially in the software industry, most
notably, Bill Gates.
There are as many working models and organizational forms as there are foundations, but key
characteristics include:
. Faster grant-making
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o Increasing the flexibility3 of grant-making by reducing bureaucratic red-tape
with shorter grant applications, quicker review cycles, and granting funds on on-
going basis8"1
o Increasing agility of the DFF to respond more quickly to rapidly changing science
discoveries9 with scientifically-informed program management
Shoring up financial sustainability of grantee by supporting long-term capital needs.18
Instead of thinking of grants in 1 year chunks, DFFs began to strategically allocate
follow-on funds for potentially multi-year, successful programs.
o Broadening and diversifying source of funds from one category (e.g. donations)
to many (e.g. syndicate of investors16 )
o Assisting with capital raising by connecting partners with high-net worth
individuals from its donor pool and venture capitalists on the foundation's
Board of Directors, and even accompanying startups on the road to actively
fundraise18
o Engaging in a long-term relationship with the partner and being kept up-to-date
on changing program and financial needs22
o Signaling a "Good Housekeeping" seal of approval to the science behind the
drug program to prospective partners and investors by independently vetting
the company's science5
* Funding "high risk, high reward" 4 projects" as a complement to NIH funding
o Defraying early financial risk by funding creative ideas with sound scientific
basis5
o Seeking "risky, innovative ideas that are likely to draw further funding down the
road" 8
o Creating a market in the translational research space
o Supporting politically risky projects9 (e.g. stem cell research)
o Proactively identifying & filling key gaps in public funding3
* Greater disclosure and accountability2 0 with transparent performance metrics22
o Measuring impact-to-effectiveness ratios, negotiating and agreeing on time-
dependent milestones between the grantor and grantee4
o Unbiased 3rd party evaluation of grants4
e Closely connecting the donor "activist" and beneficiary with an interactive approach22
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o Ranges from day-to-day operations involvement to high-level board seat 8
o High levels of engagement, increasing information flow and decreasing
information asymmetry, including sharing of business expertise
16
'
18
* Applying good governance and management practices, developing organizational
capabilities22
o Strategy, personnel and management support5, training
o Organizational capacity, infrastructure, and funding needs16
* Acting as a hands-on facilitator, catalyst2,8 than a passive actor
o Shifting from "oversight" mentality to "partner" relationship22
Current Landscape of Venture Philanthropists
Venture philanthropy is a very malleable term. Like social enterprise, venture philanthropy has
been defined so broadly in publications and the lay press that that its umbrella covers
everything from microfinance to charter schools. As a catchphrase, venture philanthropy
encompasses a universe of approaches.17 It simultaneously describes a protagonist and a
process as well as very different relationships between various stakeholders. In most cases, the
relationship resembles partnerships between venture capitalists and their respective portfolio
companies.,16 22 Listed below are few of many permutations:
* One Philanthropist Model
o One wealthy funder-entrepreneur - One or multiple non-profit (e.g. Skoll
Foundation's Urgent Threats Fund" 2, Gates Foundation, Andy Grove23 )
e Multiple Philanthropists Model
o Syndicate of wealthy funder-entrepreneurs - One or multiple non-profit(s) (e.g.
Silicon Valley Social Venture Fund12 )
o Donations/services from many wealthy entrepreneurs - New "venture
fund"/consulting foundation - One or multiple non-profits (e.g. Social Venture
Partners 7 )
* Secondary venture philanthropy funds Model
o Venture capital fund - Off-shoot fund - One or multiple non-profits (e.g.
Flatiron Future Fund 17)
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o Established non-profit - Off-shoot fund - One or multiple investigators, one or
multiple entities (both non-profit and for-profit) (e.g. James Irvine Foundation")
Primary venture philanthropy funds Model
o Established non-profit - For-profit entities (e.g. Cystic Fibrosis Foundation)
o Foundation - Charities (Roberts Enterprise Development Fund' 7)
o Foundation - Foundation (Case Foundation - ABC2)
As the examples above show, there are multiple relationship modalities. Additionally, the flow
of money from the original donor to the final grantee can range from 1 (the donor gives money
to the grantee organization or individual) to 3 (the donor gives money to a foundation, the
foundation allocates grants to a charity, the charity uses these funds to support a grantee
organization/individual). Nevertheless, all of these donors and organizations self-categorize
themselves as practitioners of the venture philanthropy philosophy. As the field of venture
philanthropy matures and is codified, the diversity of organizational models and practices
continues to grow.
In a 2004 survey conducted by Rebecca Wyhof at theUniversity of North Carolina at Chapel Hill,
the nature of the nonprofit-venture philanthropy foundation relationship was characterized as
being "involved, passionate, supportive, financially invested, proactive, engaged, accessible, and
more committed than other funders." 28 foundations were selected on a literature review, and
included many noted organizations such as the Robin Hood Foundation, Social Venture Partners,
The Broad Foundation, the Silicon Valley Social Venture Fund, etc. Three to four grantees per
foundation were selected at random to receive a survey questionnaire to examine the
administrative impact of "high-involvement" practices utilized by venture philanthropy funders.
Surveryrespondents indicated that the financial commitment was only one of many resources
that the foundation brought to bear on its grantees. The survey also noted that negative
impressions to venture philanthropy included'(3:
* Intrusive and controlling foundations'6
Inexperienced investors who blindly applied for-profit business practices, where staff
time was spent educating the funders"
e Resentment amongst foundation staff: micromanaging and high-maintenance funders16
Page 13 of 71
Contrast with the NIH
Venture philanthropy papers typically raise the question of whether philanthropic donations
26guarantee better science than government or industry. I argue here that this is the wrong
question. DFFs, NIH, and industry are all trying to solve, with some overlap, different problems
within different business models and incentive structures. Each answers to a different set of
constituencies. The NIH, for example, is accountable to the American public taxpayer via
politicians. Thus its funding strictures reflect its conservative nature.3 The NIH and its member
institutes select mostly low-risk, "safe" projects8''1 .The investigators who receive NIH funding
have trended towards older age and greater seniority. Industry is answerable to its shareholders
or private equity investors and is relentlessly focused on maximizing financial return. DFFs are
accountable to its donors and patients, and focuses on filling translational gaps where NIH
cannot go and industry finds insufficiently profitable. Although NIH funding dwarfs private funds
for research in relative terms (e.g. $2.54B in NIH funding for Alzheimer's research vs. $260M
foundation monies from 1998 to 2007, not including Alzheimer Drug Discovery Foundation
funding25), DFFs have the freedom to funds riskier science with high potential clinical impact.
The NIH is not inured from public inquires to produce tangible results. Responding to criticisms
that its research efforts were not assisting innovative therapies to move from bench to bedside,
it created the NIH Roadmap for Medical Research to "catalyze" translational research. As NIH
funding flows to specific areas, DFFs often react by supplementing and/or complementing in an
attempt to maximize both government and private dollars. As the recent economic downturn
20,24shrinks endowments and drives down donations , private funds are stretched to complement
NIH grants. The American Recovery Reinvestment Act (aka "stimulus bill") injected an additional
$10.5B into research funding, but most will still be allocated to basic research.
Prior to DFVP, DFFs hewed closely to the traditional NIH grant process. Most grants were given
to researchers and investigators in university labs and academic medical centers (AMCs).
However, in response to pressures to be more results oriented, venture philanthropic
foundations have articulated their value drivers as producing multiplicative effects on their
initial investments.2  The terminology shift from "grants" to "investments" signaled a change in
how venture philanthropic foundations envisioned the relationship with their recipients. A grant
implied a one-time, one-way transfer of funds with little or no follow-up or oversight.
Additionally, grants have been and continue to be strongly associated with the NIH model of
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basic science funding with its laissez faire feedback process. By rebranding grants as
investments, the DFF value proposition has expanded to include non-financial resources. Often,
this was and is called "innovation capital" or "risk capital" in venture philanthropy literature.8
(For the purposes of this paper, "grant" and "investment" will be used interchangeably).
Additionally, "grantees" are often renamed as "'partners", subtly upending the power dynamic
embedded in a grantor-grantee relationship.
Key value drivers that these venture philanthropic advocates assume that they will bring to a
partnership include:
* Money 2
* Introductions to knowledgeable and wealthy people2
e Neutral "safe" collaborative space
* Sophisticated media2
* Access to technology2
Venture philanthropy has been in vogue in areas such as education and global health (e.g.
Medicines for Malaria Venture - 1999 global alliance partnered w/ industry to conduct clinical
trials). 4 Biomedical venture philanthropy has been led by global health, primarily championed by
the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation with its $25B endowment.
On a macro level, private non-for-profit support of biomedical research was estimated to have
increased by 36% from $1.8B in 1994 to $2.5B in 2003 (inflation-adjusted numbers in 2003
dollars).3,9 Hamilton Moses's source by source breakdown in this 2005 JAMA article, "Financial
Anatomy of Biomedical Research", show a stunning increase in biomedical research funds by
pharmaceutical firms as reported by PhRMA, the umbrella organization for pharmaceutical
companies. Sources included foundations, medical research organizations, free-standing
research institutes, so the $2.5B in 2003 overstates the contribution of biomedical foundation.
All US biomedical research funding was estimated to have doubled from $47.8B in 1994 to
$94.3B in 2003 (inflation-adjusted numbers in 2003 dollars). The average breakdown by source
was 57% industry, 28% NIH ($29B), 3-5% state-local government and private funds as seen in
Table 1 below.9
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Table 1: Breakdown of Biomedical Research Funding by Source in US
Billions (1994-2004)9
199 1 95 1996 1997~ 1998 200202 203 20
$11.4 $12.2 $13.1 $15.0 $17.1 $19.8 $22.3 $26.4
(26%) (26%) (25%) (26%) (24%) (25%) (25%) (28%)
$2.2
(5%)
$2.7
(6%)
$2.1
(4%)
$2.8
(6%)
$2.4
(5%)
$3.0
(6%)
$3.4
(6%)
$3.2
(6%)
$5.2
(7%)
$3.5
(5%)
$6.7
(8%)
$3.7
(5%)
$7.6
(8%)
$4.0
(4%)
$6.9
(7%)
$4.3
(5%)
Foundations,
charities, and $1.4 $1.4 $1.6 $1.6 $2.0 $2.1 $3.4 $2.6 $2.6 $2.5 N/A
other private (4%) (3%) (4%) (3%) (4%) (4%) (5%) (3%) (3%) (3%)
fundsI
$13.6
(32%)
$7.9
(18%)
$3.8
(9%)
$43.1
$15.5
(33%)
$9.0
(19%)
$4.4
(9%)
$47.6
$17.1
(32%)
$10.6
(20%)
$4.7
(9%)
$52.9
$18.5
(32%)
$10.7
(18%)
$5.3
(9%)
$58.2
$21.4
(30%)
$14.2
(20%)
$6.3
(9%)
$71.0
$23.5
(30%)
$15.7
(20%)
$7.3
(9%)
$79.4
$25.7
(28%)
$20.5
(23%)
$8.25
(9%)
$90.9
$27.0
(29%)
$17.9
(19%)
$9.2
(10%)
$944.3
ADJUSTEDTOTAL* $47.8 $50.3 $53.1 $57.6 $62.6 $66.9 $78.9 $85.1 $94.6 $94.3 N/A
*Adjusted Total = Adjusted by Biomedical Research and Development Price Index. BRDPI measures how much the NIH budget must change to maintain
same purchasing power.'
The CAGR of NIH funding from 1994 to 2003 was 9.8%, versus a foundation and private funds
CAGR of 6.0% over the same time period. In addition, NIH funding from 2000 to 2009 increased
by a CAGR of 3.9% according to the NIH's Research Portfolio Online Reporting Tools (RePORT)
(http://report.nih.gov/rcdc/categories/ ), versus 2000-2009 US inflation CAGR of 2.3%,
according to www.usinflationcalculator.com. (Table 2)
Table 2: NIH Funding in US Billions (2000-2009)
NIH $14.8B $16.8B $19.11 $21.9B $22.9B $23.4B $23.2B $21.3B $23.5B $21.78 3.9%
Foundation funding made up a very small percentage (<5%) of all US biomedical funding. As
seen in Table 1, percentage allocations across industry, National Institute of Health (NIH), and
other sources remained consistent in the 1994-2003 timeframe, but industry shifted a higher
percentage of its resources from pre-clinical, early-stage development to less risky, later-stage
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NIH
other federal
State and local
governments
$10.4
(28%)
$2.1
(6%)
$2.3
(6%)
$10.9
(27%)
$2.3
(6%)
$2.5
(6%)
$26.9
$6.4
N/A
Pharmaceut
firms
Biotechnolo
firms
Medical dev
firms
ical $11.1
(30%)
gy $7.0
(19%)
ice $2.7
(7%)
TOTAL $37.1
$11.9
(30%)
$7.7
(19%)
$3.4
(8%)
$40.1
$30.6
$19.8
$10.8
$94.5
activities.9 The NIH continues to focus on relatively low-risk basic research that relies on a
democratic study section review process for grant funding.3 The NIH-style of funding was
considered the gold standard of grant making in biomedical research until recently.''' 8 Richard
Sprout, former executive director of the Ellison Medical Foundation and ex-director of the
National Institute on Aging, has echoed these criticisms of a conservative NIH. When he was at
the NIH, he recalls having to contemplate whether he could "live with [the award] on the front
page of The Washington Post.3 Biomedical foundations still continue to model their basic
research grant processes after the NIH.
Focus on Disease-Focused Foundation (DFF) Activities
In the past 10 to 20 years, there has been a rise of disease focused foundations (DFF) that are
wholly devoted to or have subsidiaries devoted to de-risking promising drug candidates in the
drug discovery and development value chain. DFFs focus on a narrow therapeutic scope or
orphan diseases with small markets and thus perceived limited market upside.5 Another
targeted area of funding to address perceived market failure has been neglected diseases of
poverty such as malaria and tuberculosis. DFFs, in essence, seek to create functioning markets
where they perceive the greatest market failures. These failures are usually located in the
transition from the academic investigator's lab to human clinical trials. This phase in the drug
discovery and development lifecycle is known as translational research and early-stage
development. Pharmaceutical and medical device companies looking to evaluate the financial
net present value of potential programs rely on market estimates, total development costs, and
robust intellectual property. These players often shied away from investing in markets with a
small number of patients, as this effectively capped the number of potential customers and
decreased the probability that sales of this product could increase earnings and pass the internal
hurdle rate. By de-risking clinical uncertainty and lowering development costs, DFFs have sought
to change the equation in their favor.
The premise is that by providing crucial capital during the drug development lifecycle at
precisely the point where capital is most scarce, DFFs can move forward the drug/therapy/tool
program to the point where it can garner more traditional funding from venture capitalists,
large life science companies, or the public markets. For example, the Cystic Fibrosis Foundation
made waves with the first and largest DFVP collaboration to date; $46.9M over 5 years to
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Aurora Biosciences to screen potential drug candidates for cystic fibrosis in May 2000.1s Older
DFFs have evolved from investigator-initiated research to directing research efforts with the aid
of commercial partners. The Juvenile Diabetes Research Foundation, for example, at over 4
decades old is one of the longest running DFFs. They initiated DFVP efforts about 5 years ago
and have ramped up outreach efforts to biotech and pharmaceutical companies for future
collaborations.
The Gates Foundation is one of the most well-known examples of a foundation deliberately
creating markets where it perceives market failure. The Gates Foundation founded the Global
Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization (GAVI) program in 1999 with $750M to purchase
vaccines and negotiate tricky differential pricing deals between poorer countries and vaccines
manufacturers. It is estimated that 80% of Gates Foundation funding is channeled through
existing public-private partnerships with a motley crew of players. These include wealthy
donors, national governments, national health agencies, UN and WHO agencies, vaccine
manufacturers and distributors, etc. The Gates Foundation venture philanthropy model
embodies the shift from the foundations dealing with a single class of grantees (e.g. academic
investigators), to multiple stakeholders and partners. DFFs engaged in DFVP have started to
grapple with the complexities of partnering with not only their traditional grant recipients, but
also with high-maintenance donors, motivated patient organizations, the NIH, the FDA and
other regulatory bodies, big pharmaceuticals manufacturers, small biotechnology companies,
venture capitalists, CROs (clinical research organizations), IP (intellectual property) lawyers,
university technology transfer offices, etc.
Key Questions
As DFFs and patient groups raised questions as to the lack of any real output from their grants,
they began to understand the potential to diversify from a simple NIH-style grant model to one
that addressed the market failures in translational research. They identified that there were
significant barriers to academic therapeutic discovery and development."The following factors
were described by Dr. Mason Freeman, Director of Translational Medicine, at the Massachusetts
General Hospital in Boston, Massachusetts.
. Medicinal chemistry not strongly supported in academia
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" Expertise in key regulatory, CMC (process chemists, etc.), and toxicology disciplines
lacking
* Timelines of academia not focused on patent expirations and speed (loss of sense of
urgency)
* Financial costs of development beyond budgets
* Concerns over conflicts of interests dissuade participation
* Promotions/recognition incentives not aligned with drug discovery process (may be less
true in academic medical settings and teaching hospitals, and its ilk)
* Financial rewards of drug development not central to academic mission
As DFFs began to understand academic science incentives and constraints, they realized that
academic medicine had neither the resources nor incentives to drive drug development past the
initial basic discovery phase. Academics were not interested in scaling and manufacturing
issues, process developments, quality control, and other rote activities that had to take place
before proof of concept trials in animals for a potential IND filing.
However, to our knowledge, no study has rigorously compared the productivity and impact of
foundation-funded projects and programs to that of government funded support in the
biomedical arena. This would be difficult to understand as most investigators use multiple and
diverse sources of funding to finance their laboratories and post-docs. Regardless of the source
of funds, the definition of a successful project was for many years rooted in academia. Metrics
such as the number of citations (relative to other papers in that field), relative prestige of the
publication, prizes and honors awarded from organizations like the National Academic of
Sciences (NAS) served as common yardsticks for academic investigators who received the bulk
of DFF funding. These metrics mirrored academic career incentives.3
Foundations like the Howard Hughes Medical Institute (HHMI) that are focused on basic science
research continue to measure success by the number of "plaudits won by its scientists" relative
to other investigators. HHMI calculated that is investigators were l0x more likely to be elected
to NAS and 16x more likely to win a Nobel prize that those funded by NIH. These metrics serve
as proxies for the success of foundation funding for cutting-edge research.
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This paper seeks to examine the DFF view of the current market failures, how these DFVP
programs map to the drug development value chain, and the deal characteristics including
sourcing, selection, project governance and control of DFVP deals. We analyze these questions
in four general categories:
1. Investment allocation: Where is the DFF currently investing along the drug development
value chain?
2. Investment decision-making: How is the DFF sourcing, selecting, and crafting its deals?
3. Investment governance: How is the DFF controlling and governing its investments?
4. Investment value drivers: How does the DFF perceive itself to add value to its
investments?
Data and Methods
This paper seeks to analyze the programs and initiatives that disease focused foundations (DFFs)
currently use to commercialize technologies, therapies, and tools relevant to their respective
diseases and/or therapeutic areas. Additionally, I examined the "nuts and bolts" of how disease
focused venture philanthropy (DFVP) is currently being implemented in DFFs. I also look at
specific challenges and best practices faced by DFFs in initiating or implementing DFVP. For this
analysis, data was gathered from publications, DFF websites, the Faster Cures' TRAIN (The
Center for Accelerating Medical Solutions) Resources section, the financial statements inside
DFF annual reports, Harvard Business Publishing cases, and phone interviews with key DFF staff.
Literature searches focused on venture philanthropy and DFVP whenever possible. MIT Library's
Vera database of e-journals was the starting point for all searches. Publications searched
included Nature News (Biomedical Philanthropy special section), JAMA, Chronicle of
Philanthropy, etc. A Google Scholar search was utilized to locate ancillary articles that could not
be found in MIT's Vera's database.
2008 and 2009 annual reports of DFFs that were known to be engaged in DFVP were
downloaded from each respective foundation's website and were examined for specific
program details. The Harvard Business Publishing (HBP) case on the Cystic Fibrosis Foundation
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and its dealings with Vertex Pharmaceuticals during its acquisition of Aurora Biosciences was the
paper that germinated this thesis topic. A draft copy of the HBP Myelin Repair Foundation case
was utilized as it was being written during spring 2010 for a Harvard Business School MBA class
discussion.
Sixteen 1-hr telephone interviews with foundation staff in the following DFFs were conducted
between February and April 2010. Foundation staff contacts were provided by Professor Fiona
Murray, students in her thesis group, previous relationships, suggestions from other DFFs, and a
general Google search. Each interviewee was asked about their background, their roles and
responsibilities in their current positions, and different programs and processes that were used
in their DFF. Interview notes were written in real-time, and are available from the author.
DFF Phone Interviews List
1. Accelerate Brain Cancer Cure Foundation (ABC2)
2. Alzheimer's Drug Discovery Foundation
3. Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation
4. Christopher Reeve Foundation
5. Cystic Fibrosis Foundation
6. Epilepsy Therapy Project
7. Faster Cures
8. Foundation Fighting Blindness
9. Juvenile Diabetes Research Foundation
10. Leukemia and Lymphoma Society
11. Michael J. Fox Foundation for Parkinson's Research
12. Multiple Myeloma Research Foundation
13. Muscular Dystrophy Association
14. Myelin Repair Foundation
15. Prostate Cancer Foundation
Interview questions asked included the following:
* Do grant monies from your DFF act as complements or substitutes?
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e Does increased NIH funding towards your particular disease decrease or increase private
foundation grants?
e Historically, why has your DFF grants not led to a successfully commercialized therapy?
Where is the source of the market failure? Or do they address market failures?
* What is the deal structure of your venture philanthropy partnerships (e.g. equity
investments, milestone payments, royalty-based, etc.)? What is the governance
structure?
* What are hypotheses espoused by your DFF with regards to the problem of funding low-
priority charity product development?
* How is your DFF allocating monies and exerting control? How does your DFF perceive
themselves to add value (e.g. $, expertise, materials)?
" What incentives exist today for early-stage companies to pursue projects funded by
your DFF? How can foundations create the proper structure with regards to market-
making, materials, etc?
The report focuses on the well-known DFFs currently practicing on DFVP. There are undoubtedly
other DFVP practicing DFFs that have been omitted in the analysis. DFFs that were analyzed in
this section were chosen for data availability and accuracy. Any omission is unintentional and
should be construed accordingly. Categorizations of the DFVP programs were based on
interviews, annual reports, and publically available information. If sufficient information could
not be found and/or was requests for information were declined, the categorization was
omitted.
The set of DFFs analyzed were as follows.
1. Alzheimer's Drug Discovery Foundation
2. Christopher Reeve Foundation
3. Cystic Fibrosis Foundation
4. Epilepsy Therapy Project
5. Foundation Fighting Blindness
6. Juvenile Diabetes Research Foundation
7. Leukemia and Lymphoma Society
8. Michael J. Fox Foundation for Parkinson's Research
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9. Multiple Myeloma Research Foundation
10. Myelin Repair Foundation
11. Prostate Cancer Foundation
Investment Allocation: Where is the DFF currently investing along the
drug development value chain?
The drug discovery and development pathway has been described at length in academic
publications, the lay press, business journals, and online. A general description of each
significant phase of the process is described below. The specific details of each process will not
be described here. A primer written by the Institute for the Study of Aging and Alzheimer
Research Forum is available for interested readers at
http://www.alzforum.org/drg/tut/ISOATutorial .pdf.
Generally, the drug development pipeline has three major sequential stages: Research,
Translational Research, and Clinical Research. Each stage is broken down into a series of smaller
processes, as shown below. Basic research, the first stage, is where science and technology is
explored by scientists in mostly academic and sometimes corporate settings. Translational
research, the second stage, takes the discoveries and advances from basic research and fashions
disease models, new targets for therapies, and chemicals aimed at blocking/activating steps in
the disease process. Additionally, transitional research encompasses in vivo testing in animals
such as mice and dogs. A crucial step in translational research is the tests to understand how
this drug candidate might behave in a human being. Once sufficient evidence from animal
studies is available, pharmaceutical and biotechnology companies solicit and receive regulatory
approval from the FDA to begin human clinical trials. The last phase, clinical research, centers on
safety and efficacy of said drug candidate in human beings.
Commercializing a successful drug, that is, going through each and every step of the drug
development pathway, has been compared to trying to thread a long string through 10,000
sequential needles. Miss any checkpoint and the program is doomed.
The first phase, basic research, has mostly been in the province of academic researchers. These
are the primary investigators (PIs) who run laboratories in universities and research hospitals all
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over the world. The vast bulk of their funding is funneled from the US government via the NIH
and its member institutes.
Clinical research, the last phase, is performed almost exclusively by for-profit healthcare
companies such as pharmaceutical and biotechnology companies. These companies partner
with CRO's (Clinical Research Organizations) to efficiently manage and supervise complex
human trials that span multiple centers, geographies, investigators, and years.
The translational research has been identified as the "Valley of Death" as most DFF funded
research historically did not make the transition to clinical trials. The reasons have been
delineated in the background section regarding the factors that impede academic investigators
from successfully translating their scientific discoveries. Additionally, biopharmaceutical
companies historically have not had the appetite for licensing therapeutic candidates prior to
solid pre-clinical and/or Phase 1 clinical trial data.
Figure 1: Drug Development Value Chain
Basic biology Process chemistry, high
research in throughput screening,
disease structural -based design,
etiologies computation biology
Basic Discovery Lead Molecule Pre-Clinical
Research Research Animal
Identification of biomarkers, DME, toxicology, PIK,
target and pathway proof of concept
validation, animal models
development
Registration trials for
safety and efficacy
Human Clinical Sttihies
*
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The solid green, and dotted yellow and red lines signal the three general market failure areas of
the DFFs analyzed. The green box indicates the historical DFF grant-making focus on
investigator-driven basic research. The yellow dotted box indicates the diversification into some
or all translational activities. The red dotted box indicates that the DFF is willing to support, at
minimum, initial human clinical trials. Note that as the scope of the DFF broadens, the amount
of risk capital at stake increases, and the dollars needed to drive development explodes.
To date, few foundations have articulated that they are ready and willing to drive promising
programs all the way through registration trials. The DFFs who are actively engaged in later-
stage clinical trials correlate with the largest cumulative fund level over their history. General
details about the DFVP programs of DFFs profiled here can be found in Appendix A.
Investment Decision-Making, Governance, and Value Drivers Factors
Many of the descriptive partnership factors listed below were taken from a 2003 paper by
Lerner, Shane, and Tsai that examined biotechnology alliances.3s Each foundation was assessed
across the selected categories using their respective 2008 or 2009 annual reports and through
phone interviews. Assessments were made based on partnerships with commercial partners
wherever possible.
Investment Decision-Making: How is the DFF sourcing, selecting, and
crafting its deals?
" Sourcing and Selection:
o Source of partnership: investigator, company, DFF
o Selection process: business advisory board, science advisory board, both, none,
other
o Due diligence resources: in-house, outsource, hybrid, etc.
" Deal terms:
o Financial instruments: Milestone-based payments, return capped at multiple of
future sales, equity investments, warrants, other
o Duration (length of partnership) 35
o Payment at time of signing/closing35
o Min, max, median total grant amounts in US dollars
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* Intellectual Property (IP):
o Ownership of patents generated by partnership: DFF, partner, other
o March-in/reversion/interruption rights
o Publications and knowledge sharing
Investment Governance: How is the DFF controlling and governing its
investments?
e Governance:
o Frequency of updates: monthly, quarterly, bi-annually, annually, never, other
o Seat on partner's board
o Equity stake w/ associated voting rights
o Oversight board/committee
" Other control rights:
o Day to day project management: DFF, partner, both
o Alterations to scope by extending duration of project, DFF, partner, both
o Alterations to scope by cancelling partnership: DFF, partner, both
Investment Value Drivers: How does the DFF perceive itself to add
value to its investments?
* Perceived DFF value drivers:
o Business strategy
o Scientific advisors
o Venture capital
DFF Categories
Additionally, each DFF was characterized by the several foundation-level characteristics.
" Source of funds: Few major donors, Large number of donors, Family foundation, Parent
organization, other
* DFF years in existence: 0-5, 6-10, 10+ years
e Overall annual fund level: <$25M, $25-50M, $50-100M, $100M+
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* Performance metrics used to gauge success
e Number of commercial partners
e Total $$ spent on for-profit grants
* Spun-out companies
* Organize conferences to bring multiple stakeholders together
The scope of the paper encompasses US-based, private-public partnerships between disease-
specific non-profit organizations (or DFFs) and industry (biotech, pharma, CEOs, anyone in the
for-profit biomedical ecosystem). These were public charities who received financial support
from the public, wealthy individuals, and other foundations as defined by IRS section 501(c)(3).
Entities outside of the scope include medical research organizations such as the UK's Wellcome
Trust or Howard Hughes Medical Institute (HHMI), health delivery services organizations,
government funding organizations (e.g. NIH, any institute under the NIH), non-life science and
non-medical organizations.
Results and Analysis
Investment Allocation: Map of DFVP Programs
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Figure 2: Map of DFVP Programs across Drug Development Value Chain
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The DFFs mapped to 4 different groups with increasing scope. Three DFFs in Group 1 spanned
the entire continuum from basic research to Phase 3 registration trials; four DFFs in Group 2
funded up until proof of concept Phase 2 trials; 3 DFFs in Group 3 focused up until Phase 1
safety trials, and 1 DFF in Group 4 stayed exclusively in the translational research and preclinical
validation space.
The Alzheimer's Drug Discovery Foundation (ADDF), Cystic Fibrosis Foundation (CFF), and
Juvenile Diabetes Research Foundation (JDRF), are the 3 DFFs in Group 1 with the broadest
funding scope. These 3 DFFs are amongst the longest years in existence, and have more detailed
performance scorecards to assess historical performance and inform future investments. For
example, ADDF looked at how far any particular project progressed per ADDF dollar spent and
the amount of follow-on funding. CFF created a point scoring system to judge overall pipeline
progress for a bottoms-up approach, and complemented this with a top-down life expectancy
measure. JDRF laid out 6 strategic therapeutic objectives, and measured each project against
whether it advanced any of these goals.
It is interesting to note that as the public markets and venture capitalists have shifted away from
pre-clinical compounds with long investment horizons, DFFs like the Cystic Fibrosis Foundation
and Leukemia and Lymphoma Society have had to broaden their de-risking activities.41 It was
originally postulated that a DFF would need to fund up to Phase I at the latest before another
partner would come in for the "handoff" to take it through later stage clinical trials. It has
become clearer that this is no longer the case. Future developers are asking for more Phase 11
and even Phase Ill trials before they license the program in question. Thus, the market failure
being addressed by DFFs continues to shift and broaden to downstream drug development.
The Foundation Fighting Blindness (FFB), Multiple Myeloma Research Foundation (MMRF),
Leukemia and Lymphoma Society (LLS), and Michael J. Fox Foundation for Parkinson's Research
(MJFF) in Group 2 all sponsored projects up to Phase 2 trials. All of these DFFs had large
cumulative fund levels in excess of $100+ over the DFF's existence. These DFFs felt that their
current resources were insufficient to fund large scale Phase 3 trials, and were all actively
sought positive, ongoing relationships with industry heavyweights to ensue projects funded up
to Phase 2 did not fall off a cliff.
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Within each DFF, annual priority-setting sessions would dictate portfolio optimization. For
example, the Foundation Fighting Blindness chose NOT to fund wet macular degeneration
projects because that was considered to be commercially well-funded. It decided instead to
focus on markets that lacked capital, such as inheritable retinal diseases.
The Epilepsy Therapy Project (ETP), Prostate Cancer Foundation (PCF), and Christopher & Dana
Reeve Foundation were the 3 DFFs in Group 3 who were comfortable making grants up until
Phase 1 human safety trials. This was a strategic decision on the part of ETP and PCF to focus
their efforts on the translational phases of drug development. They felt that the scientific
understanding of their disease was at a stage where better animal models and clinically
validated tools needed further development vs. pushing potential therapies into clinical trials. A
note about the Christopher & Dana Reeve Foundation: they have made one-off DFVP
investments, but are still planning a more cohesive DFVP rollout, and thus do not have a
formalized DFVP program.
Finally, the Myelin Repair Foundation (MRF), a DFF looking to cure multiple sclerosis, in Group 4
focused exclusively on target identification projects. As a DFF with relatively less funds vis-h-vis
the older, more established DFFs, the MRF is taking a step-wise approach by choosing to stay in
a narrower band of drug development.
The minimum, maximum, and mean deal amounts did not correlate to where any particular
group. For example, Group 1 had ADDF at one end of the spectrum with relatively small bets
with mean amounts of $600k, whereas JDRF made relatively larger deals with means of $2M per
partnership. On the similar note, Group 2's Leukemia and Lymphoma Society made fewer
number of grants with larger amounts up to a maximum of $3.7M per deal, but the Multiple
Myeloma Research Foundation signed more deals with less given per deal and a maximum of
$1.5M.The DFFs in Group 3, with less emphasis on human clinical trials than Groups 1 & 2,
logically spend less per deal with have lower maximum amounts as well.
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Investment Decision-Making: Sourcing and Selection
Table 3: Sourcing & Selection Categorization of Interviewed DFFs
Source of Selection Process: Due Diligence
Partnership: iBusiness Advisory Resources:
Sourcing & Selection Board, Science
Investigator, Advisory Board, Both In-house, Outsour ce,
Company, DFF Hybrid71S
Alzheimer's Drug Discovery Foundation / Institute nvegBH
for the Study of Aging2 12s ner
2 Christopher & Dana Reeve Foundation39  Investigator, Company Science Advisory OutsourceBoard
3 Cystic Fibrosis Foundation' 5 ,30, 36  Hybrid
4 Epilepsy Therapy Project 28  Hybrid
5 Foundation Fighting Blindness38  Company DFF Outsource
6 Juvenile Diabetes Research Foundation (JDRF)27 29 Hybrid
7 The Leukemia & Lymphoma Society33  BOth Hybrid
8 Michael J. Fox Foundation for Parkinson's HybridResearch 7  compan ,
9 Multiple Myeloma Research Foundation32  a
'oathIn-house
10 Myelin Repair Foundation24  Investigator, DFF Outsource
11 Prostate Cancer Foundation3' Investigator, Company Both Outsource
Most DFFs had multiple sources of partnerships: investigator, company, and internally. In many
cases, the DFF was approached by companies looking for potential partnerships. The only DFF
that did not have companies as the primary source of deals was the Myelin Repair Foundation,
which was a function of the MRF's narrow focus on target identification activities. As DFFs began
to build name recognition and scientific credibility within industry, this led to a virtuous cycle
where companies would regularly solicit the DFF for funds. When a DFF first launched a DFVP
program, it would identify tangible rewards to incentivize industry cooperation. For example,
when JDRF first rolled out its Industry Discovery & Development Partnerships (IDDP) Program,
there was much more "push" from JDRF than "pull" from potential commercial collaborators. As
the IDDP program got underway, the "pull" from potential partners became much greater than
its marketing efforts, and it found that most firms interested in the juvenile diabetes space
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proactively contacted JDRF. In 10 of the 11 DFFs interviewed, academic collaborators played
matchmaker by bringing a small company to the attention of the DFF, albeit with rarer
frequency.
DFFs also frequently engaged in annual gap analysis sessions to help identify, clarify, or update
both long-term and short-term priorities. The Gates Foundation is known for bringing all the
players to one table to brainstorm if it does not feel comfortable with its current grasp of the
state of affairs. And according to Peter Lomedico, JDRF's Director of Strategic Alliances and
Industry Partnerships, JDRF also performs formal gap analysis exercises to categorize particular
problem statements as a funding, science, or regulatory gap. Areas of opportunities for future
investments were outputs of these sessions. Requests for applications were often categorized
under the designated priority areas to help chart and track project progress and ensure a
balanced portfolio. The portfolio rebalancing review helped account for attrition of old projects
and offsets by new projects. Dr. Diana Wetmore, VP of Alliance Management at the Cystic
Fibrosis Foundation, explained that the portfolio approach necessitates "more shots on goal".
Thus it was essential that CFF systematically reviewed its current "shots" in play to see if there
were holes that needed to be plugged.
All DFFs with formal DFVP programs that were analyzed for this report used both a scientific and
business advisory committee. During the project selection process, the first step after receipt
was to have a scientific advisory committee review and vet the scientific risk and robustness of
the proposal. Larger DFFs like the JDRF have in-house research departments that complement
external scientific advisors to identify opportunities, participate in funding recommendations,
and manage relationships. If the proposal passed this step, it was then assessed by an
independent business advisory group. The group is often comprised of venture capitalists,
industry professionals from pharmaceutical and biotech companies, and entrepreneurs, and is
also heavily populated with members from the DFF's Board of Directors. The due diligence was
usually validated by external consultants, guided by foundation staff. For example, Ernst &
Young was hired by one DFF to conduct independent audits of potential partners during the
information validation stage of due diligence efforts.
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For potential partnerships with small, private partners, DFFs often took an extra step of ensuring
financial solvency for any number of years (e.g. 2-3 years) following the project. Dr. Louise
Perkins of the Multiple Myeloma Research Foundation remarked that "2 years" of funding was
needed for the MMRF to get comfortable making an investment. She also added that even over
the course of a few months of negotiations, the finances of smaller companies can change
materially, so it was imperative to receive frequently updated financials from potential partners.
Dr. Steve Rose, Chief Research Officer of Foundation Fighting Blindness, clarified that when
companies seeking non-dilutive capital from FFB had to simultaneously submit a business plan
and a scientific proposal. Taking the extra step assuages fears of running out of cash, especially
for smaller, less-established foundations like FFB and Accelerate Brain Cancer Cure (ABC2) that
do not have the deeper pockets of more established DFFs. Depending on the project scope and
grant amount, the DFF's Board of Directors might be needed at the final approval stage. Dr.
Jonathan Simons, President and CEO of the Prostate Cancer Foundation, even commented that
PCF was "not that different from a venture capital fund" in its operations.
In all cases, there was ongoing dialogue between the potential partner and the DFF to negotiate
the milestones and payment schedules and IP, as well as clarification of scientific, technical, and
clinical risks. In addition, DFFs often acted quickly once the contract was signed to accelerate the
learning curves of companies unfamiliar with their particular indication by educating them on
current tools, scientific difficulties faced in the past, etc.
Investment Decision-Making: Deal structure and deal terms
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Table 4: Deal Terms Categorization of Interviewed DFFs
Financial Instruments: Duration: Payment at Min, max, mean Company
(length of time of totalgrant matching
Deal Terms enn saet partnership) signing / amounts in US funds
future sales, equity coig olr
investments, warrants, other
Alzheimer's Drug Discovery
1 Foundation / Institute for the
Study Of Aging 21,25
2 Christopher & Dana Reeve2 Foundation"9
3 Cystic Fibrosis Foundations-30 s36
4 Epilepsy Therapy Project28
5 Foundation Fighting Blindness's
Juvenile Diabetes Research
6 Foundation (JDRF)2 7,29
The Leukemia & Lymphoma
Society33
Michael J. Fox Foundation for
8 Parkinson's Research37
Multiple Myeloma Research
9 Foundation 32
10 Myelin Repair Foundation 24
11 Prostate Cancer Foundation 3'
Convertible notes, milestone-
based payments, warrants,
royalties with cap as multiple on
investments
N/A
Milestone-based payments,
royalties with cap as multiple on
investments
Milestone-based payments,
equity investments
Milestone-based payments,
equtys nvestments
Milestone-based payments,
equity(TolerX), royalties with
cap as multiple on investments
Milestone-based payments,
equity, warrants, royalties with
capas multiple of investments
Milestone-based payments;
royalties with cap as multiple of
investments
Milestone-based payments,
royalties with cap as multiple
Milestone-based payments
N/A
1yr+ option for
follow-on
funding
N/A
Varies, starts at
2 yrs
1yr + option on
2nd yr
Varies
2-3 yrs, option
on 3+ yrs
2-3 yrs
2 yrs
2 yrs
1yr + option on
2nd yr
Varies by
program
(1998-2006)
Min;$10k, Max:
$600k, Mean:
$174k
N/A N/A
$200k/yr (pre-
Yes clinical), $75Ok/yr
(clinical)
Min: $5k, Max:
$200k, Mean:
$100k
Unknown, but 1st
collaboration w/
Oxford Biomedica
~$3M
Min: $200k, Max:
$5M, Mean: $2M
Yes Max: $3.7M
Yes N/A
Min: $0.9M, Max:
$1.5M, Mean: $1M
yes N/A
yes $300k to $1M
The most widely used investment facility was the milestone-driven grant. In the analysis, every
DFF engaged in DFVP (10 out of the 11 interviewed) utilized the milestone-driven grant as their
primary means of DFVP grant-making. This structure takes its cues from the tranches of VC
monies from a financing series3s and is comprised of an upfront payment plus one or more
subsequent payouts contingent on timeline-driven milestones and deliverables. For example,
the Multiple Myeloma Research Foundation, like most other DFFs, utilized clinical significant
goalposts for follow-on payouts such as: procurement of clinical grade drug substance for
clinical trial, initiation of pre-clinical animal studies, first patient first visit, last patient last visit.
For pre-Phase I partnerships, initiation and completion of discrete bands of activities such as
animal toxicology studies were often utilized.
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Options, warrants, and other more sophisticated investment vehicles are used much less
frequently. The only two DFFs that utilized financial instruments outside of milestone-based
payments and equity capital were the Alzheimer's Drug Discovery Foundation and the Leukemia
& Lymphoma Society. They both used hybrid securities like convertible notes and warrants to
protect their downside with a steady cash flow and keep an option on the upside by converting
to equity. Interviews with DFF staff suggested that the need for more creative financial models,
especially for DFFs who go beyond the translational space to the clinical space.It was clear that
the "comfort zone" of DFFs remained squarely within the milestone-based regimen. A reticence
to use more complicated financial investment tools may stem, especially from DFFs in Groups 1
and 2, from a fear of being perceived as too focused on the financial return of potential
investments and thus unseemly.
Equity was used with extreme caution by most DFFs. It was not ruled out as an option, but there
was a general consensus that equity investments should be made sparingly. Less than half or 4
out of the 11 DFFs utilizing equity investments as a investment vehicles. The Epilepsy Therapy
Project has made small equity investments in 5 companies, while the Leukemia & Lymphoma
Society have declared that equity investments are possible, but has chosen not to do it yet.
Representatives from both DFFs claim that equity is an option, but were still adjusting their
mindsets to embrace higher risks equity vs. lower risk milestone-based payment structures.
JDRF has made 1 equity investment out of 33 deals to date. TolerRx, a Boston-based
immunology company, raised $35M in a Series C round. JDRF invested $3.5M on the same deal
terms as the other venture capitalists and institutional investors in the syndicate.
A key disincentive for public DFFs to shy away from equity investments is how these
investments will show up on charity rating sites. If a DFF chose to take equity, it would have to
list it on their balance sheets as an asset and conduct yearly valuations. If these equity
investments "failed", the DFF would need to write down that asset, depressing their balance
sheet and subsequent ratings by outside charity evaluators like Charity Navigator. This would
discourage would-be donors from contributing.
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In addition, US Securities Act of 1933 defines an accredited investor as "any organization
described in section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code, corporation, Massachusetts or
similar business trust, or partnership, not formed for the specific purpose of acquiring the
securities offered, with total assets in excess of $5,000,000." A public DFF without an
endowment, like the Accelerate Brain Cancer Cure (ABC2) foundation, would most likely have
less than $5M in total assets and therefore unable to transact equity investments.
The duration of most deals starts at 1 to 2 years, and is coupled with an option to extend should
both parties see fit. Three DFFs, ADDF, Epilepsy Therapy Project, and Myelin Repair Foundation,
started with 1 yr partnerships, with an option to continue into the 2nd year if the negotiated
milestone during the 1s year were met. Four other DFFs, including CFF, JDRF, LLS, MJFF, and
MMRF, started with 2 year contracts that, depending on the project scope, could be extended if
necessary. Note that these 4 DFFs are all in Groups 1 or 2. It makes sense that DFFs whose
purview encompasses Phase 2/3 trials have longer initial durations, since the time to plan,
execute, and produce data from a human trial is often longer than that of a pre-clinical animal
study. Two DFFs, Foundation Fighting Blindness and the Prostate Cancer Foundation, did not
have default project durations, choosing to customize each deal as they saw fit.
There are very rarely "penalties", financial or otherwise, for companies that fail to meet the
milestones during the life of the partnership. None of the DFFs interviewed indicated that their
commercial partners were liable for any financial damages if milestones were not met. The
sentiment expressed by Rusty Bromley at the Myelin Repair Foundation was representative of
the power asymmetry most DFFs felt, "Command and control doesn't work. Coercing and
cajoling does." However, DFVP program directors brought up a DFVP meme of DFVP
investments as value-creating steps for both parties: the company can bring in non-dilutive
capital and produce value-inflected results (e.g. drug program passes animal toxicology studies),
the DFF can show a link between their investment and progress towards therapy
commercialization. A March 29, 2010 press release by Avila Therapeutics "Avila Teams with
Leukemia Society", is classic example of how a commercial partner (Avila) announces a large
investment ($3.2M) by a DFF (Leukemia & Lymphoma Society) to support a disease-focused
therapy (knocking out Btk in B-cell development thus reducing B-cell related cancers).50 Both
commercial and DFF partners "win".
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Six out of the eleven DFFs also require royalties as a potential return on their investments. It was
widely acknowledged that DFVP investments were and are not made for the purposes of a high
financial return. .As Dr. Joyce Cramer of the Epilepsy Therapy Project remarked, "When we give
money to an early stage company, the legal fees are high enough that we're not going to make
money out of it. There's no expectation of ever seeing a nickel come back to us." Nevertheless,
it is thought that a token "fair return" is appropriate as a trade-off for the non-dilutive nature of
the risk capital provided. Ultimately, DFFs want to capture any potential upside and funnel these
returns back into additional DFVP investments. Royalties hover around the low single digits, and
are usually capped between 2 to 6x multiple of the original DFVP investment. For example, JDRF
uses 3-4x and the Foundation Fighting Blindness uses 2-3x. The Leukemia and Lymphoma
Society uses a stepwise multiples model where the initial approval in a major market, such as US
or Japan, triggers a 1x return on investment. Additional multiples are sales are rolled out are
capped at 2-4x. A modest payback to the foundation based on the commercial success of the
program is thought to be more symbolic than fiscal as most projects would have negative
present values. These arrangements are usually also made applicable to any sublicensing
agreements that the commercial partner may choose to engage in.4
All DFFs with formal DFVP programs, with the notable exception of the Michael J. Fox
Foundation for Parkinson's Research, Myelin Repair Foundation and the Prostate Cancer
Foundation, require matching company funds. It is thought that companies need to show
tangible commitment by putting "skin in the game", analogous to prospective investors wanting
to see company founders put some of their personal wealth on the line. The matching
percentage varies, but most hover around 50% (also known as 1:1 matching grants). Both the
Epilepsy Therapy Project and JDRF required 1:1 matching funds, while ADDF, CFF, LLS, MMRF
vary their match requirements. The logic to incent the company by requiring internal cash use is
coupled with the lack of financial penalties to create a stronger incentive for successful project
completion.
Investment Decision-Making: Intellectual Property
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Table 5: Intellectual Property (IP) Categorization of Interviewed DFFs
Ownership of patents March-in / walk-in Publications
intlletua Prpery (P) generated by partnership: rights / reversion /andinterruption clauses knowledge
DFF, Partner, Othershrn
1 Alzheimer's Drug Discovery Foundation / Partner Varies YesInstitute for the Study of Aging21,2s
2 Christopher & Dana Reeve Foundation39  N/A N/A N/A
3 Cystic Fibrosis Foundation1,o,36  Partner Yes
4 Epilepsy Therapy Project 28  Partner Yes No
5 Foundation Fighting Blindness38  Partner Yes No
6 Juvenile Diabetes Research Foundation Partner Y5e(JDRF)27,29
7 The Leukemia & Lymphoma Society33  Partner Yes
8 Michael J. Fox Foundation for Parkinson's Partner Yea$Research31
9 Multiple Myeloma Research Foundation32  Partner Yes Ys
10 Myelin Repair Foundation24  Partner No Yes
11 Prostate Cancer Foundation3l Partner N/A Yes
To encourage the commercial partner to accelerate project development, the intellectual
property in question always resided with the partner in the 10 DFFs with formal DFVP programs,
not with the DFF. Additionally, IP generated in the duration of the project (e.g. process claims,
know how, etc.) are considered to be under the partner's control. Phone interviews suggested
that IP was an area that DFFs considered outside of their area of expertise, and was often
delegated to legal counsel or outside IP attorneys. (One noted exception was the Multiple
Myeloma Research Foundation. It hired in-house counsel to reduce inefficiencies in the contract
negotiation process.) Nevertheless, it was felt that as a business necessity, foundation staff
needed to understand the IP landscape from a commercially-attractive therapeutic perspective.
Paraphrasing Dr. Diana Wetmore of the Cystic Fibrosis Foundation, without the "philanthropy",
companies would not pick our patients to work with. Without the "venture", companies would
not be able to find a revenue stream that is attractive. And IP was the bedrock of future revenue
and freedom to operate.
However, every DFF engaged in DFVP, with the notable exception of the Myelin Repair
Foundation, has a version of what Schaner & Lubitz, PLLC calls an "interruption license."'"
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Alternatively called "march-in", "walk-in", or "reversion" rights, an interruption license protects
the project from being abandoned prior to completion due to business reasons, also called an
"interruption event". An interruption event can be broadly defined as "a cessation of reasonable
efforts to develop a commercial product from the intellectual property over an extended
period.""4These "bring back" clauses give the DFFs the right, if the company decides to halt
development for financial reasons or the company goes under, to come in, take the asset with
process know-how knowledge, and find another development partner. Should this clause be
triggered, the IP and scientific know-how would be transferred to the DFF to sub-license as it
sees fit.36 It is now considered standard best practice to include these IP clauses into the
contract as the absolute dollar amounts in DFVP awards increases and are "sufficiently large
that waste can be devastating""4
Although the triggering of an interruption license is an unfortunate event, it has occurred due to
financial insolvency. For example, the Cystic Fibrosis Foundation has had two workout situations
in the past year alone. Both Epix Pharmacueticals and Altus Pharmaceuticals had insufficient
capital to operate as a going concern, and CFF had to invoke its rights to shop the IP around to
another potential licensor. Altus Pharmaceuticals was unable to continue clinical development
of a partnered program for CFF due to insufficient funds last year. Altus had actually tried to
sub-license the Trizytek program to another potential partner, but was unsuccessful because of
the current recession. CFF ended up organizing the transfer and turnover of the IP from Altus to
Alnara Pharmaceuticals, whose President and CEO had previously served as the Chief Scientific
Officer at Altus. CFF signed a sublicense agreement with Alnara whereby CFF contributed extra
funds to complete the ongoing clinical trials. This extra incentive gave Alnara the push to
cooperate with the IP transfer and perhaps refer their soon-to-be terminated employees to
Altus."4
A frequently vocalized thorny problem was that of technology transfer offices in academic
institutions, and their apparent unwillingness to use the DFF as a broker to out-license IP. A
common problem is misunderstandings amongst the university or academic medical center
(AMC) that holds the IP, the DFF that would rather it be licensed for prospective therapies, and
the industry partner who wants robust IP to protect from competitive infringement. For
example, the Christopher & Dana Reeve Foundation had made a large award to an academic
investigator at Yale University. A biotech was involved with the R&D efforts. Yale's technology
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transfer offices were "dragging their feet", so the foundation began to deduct legal fees from
the PI award. Other DFFs have found it challenging to convince the tech transfer offices that
they are "trying to give it away".
Figure 3: Typical IP Model of Interaction between DFF, Academic
Institution, and Commercial Partner
DFF cajoles IP holder
to license to partner
/0
AM'
DFF acts as middle-man
between tech transfer office
& partner
Technology office
negotiates with
commercial partner
From a knowledge sharing perspective, partners were often required to share data with the DFF
during interim checkpoints. Disclosure requirements range from sharing data with the DFF to
open publication of results. The DFFs pooled results from various projects to create an informal
central knowledge management system, but commercial partners rarely directly shared
information with each other except for published data.
There was an acknowledgment by various DFFs that there needed to be a consensus around IP
that maximized collaboration in research, with an IP regime that favored "collaboration over
exclusivity."-42 To that end, there has been a concerted push to develop common tools that
would allow for sharing of data (e.g. patient record databases, animal models), and to
standardize much of the IP terms similar to standardized funding documents.
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Investment Governance & Value Drivers: Governance, Other
Control Rights, Perceived DFF Value Drivers
For the most part, commercial partners maintain an extraordinary amount of control over the
program. The DFF is kept in the loop regarding project progress and is called-in for problem
solving, but the partner controls the flow of information, the day-to-day operations, and the
intellectual property of the program. The ultimate lever that DFFs can exercise is the financial
commitment. In the past, DFFs have terminated or suspended projects mid-stream because of
non-progress. In these cases, more sophisticated DFFs like the CFF have arbitration clauses to
resolve conflicts over changes to project scope.
Table 6: Governance Categorization of Interviewed DFFs
Frequency of Seat on Equity stake w/ Oversight board
updates: partner's boarf the duyoAgne
Governance udtog NA/NA/
monthly, quarterly,
bi-annually, never,
5 Foudatio Figting lindnssvoN/inNg rights,
othe r
SAlzheimer's Drug Discovery Foundation Qualy No (observer Yes (pub"c No
7 Th euiia&Lmpoa oie9uaty No
Institute for the Study of Agi ng21,2s rights)pates
2 Christopher & Dana Reeve Foundation39 N/A N/A N/A N/A
3 Cystic Fibrosis Foundations,30, 36 o Quarterly No No
4 Epilepsy Therapy Project28 Annual o No No
5 Foundation Fighting Blindness3  N/A No No
6 Juvenile Diabetes Research FoundationsQu variedfro Yn s to ye(J R)27,29
7 The Leukemia & Lyrphoma Society33 Quarterly No Y6o
8n Michael J. Fox Foundation for Parkinson's c a nnualy o o i e
ha alesqurelupaewie2hbi-annual tochontThs upat metig
Research37
9 Multiple Myeloma Research Foundation32 Quarterly No NoYe
10 Myelin Repair Foundation24 N/A No No No
11 Prostate Cancer Foundational N/A No No Yes
The frequency of updates and information sharing varied from monthly to annually. Many DFFs
employed a two-tier structure of updates: a more formal, face to face update every 6 to 12
months, and an informal, conference call every 1 to 4 months. Four of the 11 DFFs interviewed
had at least quarterly updates, while 2 had bi-annual touchpoints.These update meetings
involved a combination of updates, identifying bottlenecks and other rate-limiting factors, and
creating action plans to ensure critical path risks were mitigated. Some DFFs approached these
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meetings as problem-solving opportunities, while others choose to let the partner control the
communication updates.
All 11 DFFs surveyed preferred not to take a seat on their partner's board, even if they had
equity stakes with voting rights in the commercial partner (e.g. JDRF for TolerX). Instead, every
DFF, with the exception of ADDF and MRF, there was some semblance of an oversight
committee co-led by a DFF project manager. This oversight board was utilized during update
meetings to tackle critical path items, reassess risk, and report back to their respective
constituencies on project progress. In CFF, for example, the makeup of the oversight board, also
known as a steering committee, was made up of equal parts DFF scientific advisors and partner
management/ scientists. The DFF program manager usually facilitated agenda setting. Similarly,
each partnership that LLS establishes has a Research Advisory Committee that is comprised of
members from the LLS staff, external scientists and clinicians, and company employees to
review progress and anticipate critical path issues on a quarterly basis.
Table 7: Other Control Rights Categorization of Interviewed DFFs
Day to day project Alterations to Alterations to
mgmt: scope by extending scope by cancelling
Other Control Rights DFF, Partner, Both project duration: partnership: DFF,
DFF, Partner, Both Partner, Both
Alzheimer's Drug Discovery Foundation /
Institute for the Study of Aging
21
,2s
2 Christopher & Dana Reeve Foundation39  N/A N/A N/A
3 Cystic Fibrosis Foundationis,30, 36  Partner Both DFF
4 Epilepsy Therapy Project28  Partner Partner
5 Foundation Fighting Blindness38  Partner
6 Juvenile Diabetes Research Foundation Partner Boh 0t(JDRF) 27,29
7 The Leukemia & Lymphoma Society33  Partner
8 Michael J. Fox Foundation for Parkinson's
Research 37
9 Multiple Myeloma Research Foundation32  Partner
10 Myelin Repair Foundation24  Partner
11 Prostate Cancer Foundation3' Partner Both
The day to day project operations were almost always managed by the partner One noticeable
exception was ABC2 (not included in above analysis due to lack of information). Dr. David
Sandak, VP of Operations for Entrepreneurial Programs, indicated that his DFF steps into the
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project manager's role if there are multiple stakeholders to coordinate, align, and manage. The
MMRF's Multiple Myeloma Research Consortium, a tissue bank consortium of 14 academic
medical centers, had an interesting project management where industry-style coordinators
were employed by their particular institution, but were paid by MMRC. Part of Dr. Sohini
Chowdbury's role as Associate Director and Team Leader at JDRF is to manage the project within
the pipeline programs that are launched each year, reflecting JDRF's more hands-on approach to
project management vis-b-vis that of the other DFFs surveyed. Alterations to scope by extending
or cancelling the project usually could be initiated by either party in 9 out of the 11 DFFs
analyzed, but it is important to note that the dormant interruption clause discussed in the
previous sub-section springs to life if an "interruption event" is deemed to have occurred.
Table 8: Perceived DFF Value Drivers of Interviewed DFFs
Business Strategy scientific A dvisors Venture Capital
Pereied FFvale rivrsAssistance A ccess Connections
1 Alzheimer's Drug Discovery Foundation /Institute for the Study of Aging21'25
2 Christopher & Dana Reeve Foundation39  N/A N/A N/A
3 Cystic Fibrosis Foundation15,s, 3  Yes yes yes
4 EpilepsyTherapy Project 28  Yes Yes Yes
5 Foundation Fighting Blindness38  No Yes yes
6 Juvenile Diabetes Research Foundation yes yes yes(JDRF)27,29
7 The Leukemia & Lymphoma Society33  Yes Yes Yes
8 Michael J. Fox Foundation for Parkinson's No Yes YesResearch37
9 Multiple Myeloma Research Foundation32  No Yes No
10 Myelin Repair Foundation24  No Yes No
11 Prostate Cancer Foundation3' Yes Yes Yes
DFFs all offered non-value assistance in the form of business strategy advice, scientific advisor
access, or venture capital connections. The most common driver was access to external
scientists and experts in the field, with all DFFs with formal DFVP programs offering access and
introductions to KOLs. Second was venture capital connections, with 8 out of the 11 DFFs
analyzed claiming to assist in connecting their commercial partners with venture capitalists,
usually those who sat on the DFF's Board of Directors. The least common driver was identified
to be strategic business assistance, with 6 of the 11 DFFs offering some form of business help
(e.g. pro bono consultants, etc.) to their commercial partners.
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Quick Note on Performance Metrics
Table 9: Performance Metrics of Interviewed DFFs
Perceived DFF Value Drivers Performance Metrics used to Gauge Success
Alzheimer's Drug Discovery Foundation / Institute
1 for the Study of Aging
21
'
25
2 Christopher & Dana Reeve Foundation39
3 Cystic Fibrosis Foundation15 ,30,3
6
4 Epilepsy Therapy Project28
5 Foundation Fighting Blindness38
6 Juvenile Diabetes Research Foundation (JDRF)27 ,29
7 The Leukemia & Lymphoma Society 3
8 Michael J. Fox Foundation for Parkinson's Research37
9 Multiple Myeloma Research Foundation32
10 Myelin Repair Foundation 24
11 Prostate Cancer Foundation31
1. Ratio of movement through stages through drug development per $
invested, 2. IP creation per # of programs, 3. External follow-on
funding per $ invested
N/A
Point system for projects progress to measure overall pipeline;
Measuring increases in median life expectancy
Number of grants funded (pipeline)
N/A
Progress against the 6 strategic therapeutic objectives
Measuring Increases in life expectancy (survival rates) & quality of life
Point-based scoring system, amount of information gleaned, amount
of follow-on funding
Decreasing cycle time from final protocol to first patient enrolled
1.Progress against strategic plan to identify & validate myelin repair
targets, 2. identify corporate partner(s), 3. Program progress through
drug development
Measuring increases in life expectancy; Timeframe bounded metrics
(<18 mos, 18 mos, 18+ mos.)
Taking cues from industry with ROI (return on investment), performance metrics used to gauge
partnership and project success varied amongst DFFs. The most common metric cited was an
increase in life expectancy for an average patient (seen in bold in table above), with CFF, LLS,
and PCF all measuring increases in life expectancy (or survival rates). This was felt to be a metric
that would resonate with all constituencies including patients, and kept the focus firmly on
results-oriented projects. Six DFFs used derivations of pipeline progress through the drug
discovery and development value chain. ADDF rationalized the project progress by dividing by
dollars invested, whereas both MJFF and CFF used an internally-developed point scoring system.
One proxy of project (not pipeline) success was the amount of follow-on funding per dollar
invested, which was captured directly by ADDF and MJFF, and indirectly by MRF. The level of
detail capture varied as well. For example, the Multiple Myeloma Research Foundation drilled
down into the number of days from final protocol to first enrolled patient, identified key
opportunities to "keep the trains moving", and shaved almost 40% of the original measured
time. Nevertheless, few standardized performance measures that assist DFFs with resource
allocation making decisions exist.41
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Discussion of Best Practices
Disease focused venture philanthropy (DFVP) is a relatively new business practice in the disease
focused foundation industry. Often, details about best practices are omitted or glossed over
from DFVP literature. This section discusses key DFVP practices observed at the level of the DFF.
These processes are broken out into 4 categories: Risk Management, Partner Management,
Value Drivers, and Organization. Interspersed throughout are questions that a DFF and/or
potential DFVP partner would be advised to consider.
Risk Management
Program vs. Project-Investing
The risk exposure of the DFF can vary depending on whether they choose implement a purely
program investing strategy, or fold in a few partner-based investments. Most of the DFFs with
DFVP programs engage in a program investing strategy. A program-based process conducts due
diligence at a drug candidate level. The focus is on a single project that will move the potential
therapy one step closer to commercialization. The DFF reimburses only direct project costs.
Expenses that are not directly attributable to drug development are not covered. The higher risk
partner-based investing is utilized when the company has multiple programs or a platform
technology with high potential clinical impact. The scope is broader because the diligence
encompasses questions about the partner's senior management, business model, other pipeline
programs, and investors.
If program-based investing is like dating, then partner-based investing is like marriage. A key
difference between traditional venture capital and DFVP is that VC's always invest on a partner
level, whereas DFVPs almost always prefer to invest on a project-basis. Each relationship comes
with its own implicit relationship contract, or deal structure. Program-based DFFs universally
stick to milestone-driven grants with a percentage of royalties and a cap on the original
investment. This financial instrument is easy to comprehend with negotiated deliverables and
milestones, and comes with an expiration date of 1 to 2 years.
Page 45 of 71
A middle ground between milestone-based payments and equity investments are warrants and
options. Warrants are a type of financial instrument that gives the holder, the DFF, the right to
purchase a certain amount of stock (usually common) at a certain price (usually between its
current value and future projected value) during a set duration of time. An option is similar to a
warrant in that gives the holder the right to buy the partner's common stock at a certain price
before a certain expiration date. The substantive difference between a warrant and an option is
that a warrant lifetime is much longer (e.g. 5 years) than that of an option (e.g. 6 months).
DFFs that engage in partner-based investing utilize a combination of equity, warrants, and
options. Equity investment implies that the DFF is investing in the company and its employees,
capital equipment, and intellectual property. This necessitates greater diligence from a capital
risk standpoint. For most DFFs with limited foundation staff, most of this diligence is outsourced
to external consultants. To underscore the difficulty of partner-based investing, only 3 of the 11
DFFs analyzed in the Data and Results section of this report augmented their portfolio with
partner investments. These DFFs are Epilepsy Therapy Project, Juvenile Diabetes Research
Foundation, and Leukemia and Lymphoma Society.
Portfolio Diversification
All the DFFs interviewed employed a diversified portfolio strategy that sought to maximize
limited funds and resources. Portfolio diversification is one area that DFVP differs from
traditional VC models. The partners of a venture capital firm usually create an investment thesis
to guide their portfolio investing strategy. These theses act as broad guidelines as to what
constitutes an attractive investment, and can specify any number of vectors (e.g. industry, team
experience, stage of development, geography, etc.) DFFs, however, cannot truly create an
investment thesis. There are no historical business models that can be emulated. No previous or
peer investment funds or investments in the DFVP have published fund results allowing for
comparisons between different DFVP models and outcomes.
Therefore, DFFs are left with embracing the "multiple shots on goal" approach, with its
concomitant risk. If one layers in scientific and regulatory risk, it becomes clear that the DFF
must be frank about the high potential for multiple failures before a success event. From a risk
appetite perspective, if 9 out of 10 projects fail (not an uncommon event in life sciences
investing), is that too much for your DFF to stomach? If so, then your DFF would need to focus
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on "safer" bets. ("Safer" may be defined along the scientific and/or drug development value
chain axis.) One perspective that a DFF like the Leukemia and Lymphoma Society used was to
look at their development pipeline like a "medium-sized pharmaceutical company."
The capital that the DFF provides in a partnership may be the highest risk capital at play. Several
DFFs that focus on orphan diseases like the Cystic Fibrosis Foundation have deliberately decided
to move into higher risk activities like distribution of clinical therapies to patients. They do so
after examining the market failure in these areas and concluding that their risk capital is
necessary.
According to Sohini Chowdbury, the Michael J. Fox Foundation for Parkinson's Research has had
to think long and hard about their risk appetite. It is all well and good to proclaim that your DFF
invests in "high risk, high reward" projects. It is another thing altogether to report somber
results back to your patients and donors.
In a hypothetical but very realistic case, let us say that a DFF funds 10 projects with commercial
partners in the past 5 years. One project produces a candidate worthy of a clinical trial. Five
show data that adds to the general body of knowledge of the disease, and the four remaining
projects are dead ends. Is this an unacceptable outcome?
On the opposite end of the spectrum, let us say that another DFF also funds 10 projects in the
past 5 years. This DFF deems all 10 projects to have "succeeded" by certain metrics (e.g.
progression to next development milestone, increasing life expectancy, etc). Is this too safe? If
no projects fail, then contrary to what the annual report and website states, your DFF may be
playing in the "low risk, low reward" sandbox.
Partner Management
Partner Sourcing
For the purposes of this paper, partner has been construed as a for-profit entity, usually a
biotechnology or pharmaceutical company, who is engaged in developing and selling therapies,
tools, and services in the life sciences industry. A partner, writ large, is any person or
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organization (external to the DFF) that engages in a relationship with the DFF designed to
achieve mutually reinforcing goals for both parties.
Thus partner management will depend on the makeup of the counterparty. All DFFs analyzed in
this study engaged in basic research grant funding. The partners in this NIH-style peer-reviewed,
study section grant selection process are the academic investigators who lead labs in university
and research hospital settings.
DFFs that fund outcome-based translational research in addition to basic science add another
category of partners into the mix. Depending on the translational activity, these partners can be
academic investigators, CROs, or biotech companies. A DFF who is looking to move into adding
translational partners grapples with ensuring that their basic research funds produce promising
science that can be moved into the next stage of the drug discovery value chain. The upfront
diligence involves finding suitable potential partners who are comfortable and have experience
with the disease or therapeutic area of focus, or are willing to invest the resources to gain
appropriate expertise. CROs are uniquely suited to be partners for DFFS in the translational
realm. The Cystic Fibrosis Foundation and other DFFS have worked aggressively to engage,
educate, and outfit top CROs to cut down cycle-time. Other DFFs have created an informal,
internally validated "short list" of CROs and other partners that it knows can quickly and capably
execute pre-clinical and other validation activities.
Finally, DFFs who support clinical trial development deal with another set of commercial
partners. Those who do not venture past Phase 1 and/or Phase 2a trials deal with either a CRO
who specializes in safety clinical trials and/or a small, private, VC-backed biotech firm. It is rare
that large, public pharmaceutical or biotech companies sponsor these early human trials,
especially if the purported market is small or the science is still relatively unknown. It is only
when the program has been properly "de-risked"(usually past Phase 2a, also known as "proof-
of-concept" trials) that the larger players become interested.
The ideal partner for Phase 1 or Phase 2a trials is the smaller, private, biotech company. Your
program would likely make up a larger portion of their portfolio than that of a large pharma, so
there would be more attention paid to your project. The DFF monies provided would be non-
dilutive capital, and would therefore be a welcome source of cash. There would be fewer
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bureaucratic layers of management to deal with for the DFF. Big pharma is rarely interested,
especially in orphan indications. Furthermore, their hurdle rate is even higher, and they are
prone to be extremely risk-averse due to loss aversion.
There is anecdotal data to suggest that big (and small) pharma and biotech may be coming
around to orphan indications and niche markets as lucrative sources of future income.
Successful public biotechs like Genzyme and Shire have large market capitalizations based on
rare disease franchises, and others are following suit. Venture capital investments into rare
disease drug development are not unheard of. Third Rock Ventures, a Boston based venture
capital firm, has sought opportunities into rare genetic diseases like X-linked hypohidrotic
ectodermal dysplasia and adrenoleukodystrophy, both orphan diseases with less than 200,000
patients in the US. 5 For orphan diseases, however, the small "hand-to-mouth" VC-backed
companies were thought to be "hungrier" to work with DFFs.
DFFs who engaged in late stage clinical trials viewed large pharma as carriers of the touch for
the larger Phase 2b and Phase 3 studies. There was a general understanding that large, public
life science companies viewed a project to be properly "de-risked" if it successfully met all its
primary endpoints for Phase 2 proof of concept trials. Again, folding in a large company as a
partner was understood to add additional complexity to the DFF's partner management
strategy.
All interviewed DFFs articulated that the drug development activities bookended by target ID
and Phase I trials was the "sweet spot". This "valley of death" was clearly where most DFFs felt
that DFVP could address market failure through their risk capital. Additionally, DFFs who were
most forward-thinking began to research potential partners well before any projects were on
the horizon. They looked closely at the level of experience and background of the companies,
whether they possessed the appropriate scientific and clinical expertise, and the amount of
effort the DFF would need to employ to educate them on their disease, endpoints, clinical care
methodology, etc.
Project Management, Governance, and Expectations
Once the DFF took on a partner, DFVP program managers emphasized that setting clear upfront
expectations was key to a good working relationship. For almost every for-profit partner, this
Page 49 of 71
would be their first time working with a DFF. Part of the DFF's upfront engagement entailed
educating their partners on how DFVP was executed in their particular DFF. Defining and
clarifying roles and expectations from both parties set a professional tone moving forward.16
In addition to roles explication, many DFFs followed a continuous improvement philosophy
through their annual evaluations. They took frank looks at the relationship and the interactions
between the DFF and the partner. DFFs sought to understand if their partnerships were fruitful
through partner performance metrics.
Project oversight was usually managed by a cross-functional team comprised of foundation
staff, company management, and project managers. Frequency, as seen in the Results and
Analysis section, varied from quarterly conference calls to annual meetings. Most DFFs checked
in at least twice a year to ensure that critical path items were on track on the partner's
workplan. Outside of these formal interactions, there were multiple casual touchpoints where
the DFF assisted with connecting the DFF to the right scientific experts, helping to find a good
CRO with experience in this particular patient population, or even going so far as actively helping
the company to fundraise during their next round of financing.
The sentiment was often expressed that if a project consumed a substantial amount of a DFF's
funds, and was rather risky from a scientific or clinical standpoint, it required heavy DFF
oversight. The heavy-touch approach was surprising because best practices literature would
suggest that a risky project with many untested assumptions needed the opposite. A light-touch
governance structure would allow quick decision-making autonomy to adapt to shifting
information and new information. A governance structure that insisted on weekly phone calls
with detailed updates might smother a large risky project with too many cooks in the kitchen.
Balancing accountability with the correct oversight flexibility would enable project success to
explore high-risk, high reward areas. A key recommendation would to ensure project
management that is consistent with the riskiness of the project.
Next Steps and Forward Thinking
Another issue that many DFFs face when they first enter into DFVP partnerships is that of clear
next steps. It is essential to detail explicit next steps that would be taken if the project is
successful. Corresponding resources should also be outlined and quantified if possible. Who is
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going to execute the next step? How far is your DFF willing to go to develop the therapy?
Human trials? Phase 2? Does your DFF know exactly how much you have to "de-risk" the
program for it to be attractive enough for another partner to step in? If the program is
successful, is the commercial partner's investors and management committed to developing it
to the next clinically relevant milestone?
The Myelin Repair Foundation grappled with this issue as they learned how to better de-risk
programs for potential downstream partners. This involved going beyond target identification
and into target validation, as well as cost avoidance. For Rusty Bromley, this encompassed
educating themselves on internal MS programs in partners' pipelines, and understanding how
MRF-funded projects stacked up against these internal programs.
The Epilepsy Therapy Project tackles next steps by explicitly requesting information about
commercial implications of the project, and its licensability. It asks questions that seek to
connect the proposed project with progress towards a cure by probing into its
commercialization strategy.
Value Drivers
Every DFF claimed that they brought non-cash value-added assistance to DFVP partnerships.
Their financial proposition as non-dilutive capital notwithstanding, their value proposition fell in
five main buckets: 1. Clinical networks, 2. Supporting a cast of characters, 3. Access to the best
science, 4. Good Housekeeping seal of approval, and 5. Knowledge management/collaboration.
All these resources involved pro-active engagement with external partners and suppliers. Most
DFFs with DFVP programs engaged in at least one of these services.
Clinical Network
For DFFs anticipating clinical trial testing, an integrated, clinical network with instant access to
the relevant patient population could speed recruitment and reduce redundant paperwork. The
Multiple Myeloma Research Consortium (MMRC) was created by the Multiple Myeloma
Research Foundation (MMRF) as a legally separate organization to pull together supporting
infrastructure to expedite clinical trials. The MMRC now consists of 13 academic centers and a
multi-institutional tissue bank with 1300 tissue samples and 2100 matched blood samples
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representing 1800 patients. For the MMRF, this was key to reducing "mundane inefficiencies"
associated with clinical trial conduct (e.g. budget, IP, publication, disclosure, clinical milestones)
with standardized clinical trial agreements. The Foundation Fighting Blindness (FFB) also created
the National Neurovision Research Institute (NNRI) to support translational research by pooling
resources to aid validation and clinical activities.
Accelerated Cure Project also recognized the need for a large-scale biorepository, and created
the MS Repository to collect samples from MS patients.41 ACP is accessible to investigators in
exchange for data created using these samples. The Cystic Fibrosis Foundation also created a
clinical trial network known as the Clinical Trials Network within the Therapeutic Development
Network, which acts for all intensive purposes like a CRO that can plan and run a clinical trial
from soup to nuts. 41 The Christopher & Dana Reeve Foundation, a DFF that is slowly easing into
DFVP, established the North American Clinical Trial Networks (NACTN). In fact, NACTN was
instigated by neurosurgeons who pushed for a robust clinical network focused on spinal cord
injuries.
Tied closely to clinical consortiums are comprehensive patient registries. This is an especially key
value drive for DFFs focused on orphan or homogenous small-market diseases. The time and
associated cost of patient recruitment can drag on for years and terminate trials if patients
cannot be expediently enrolled. The Cystic Fibrosis Foundation found that maintaining a current,
comprehensive patient registry with clinical and demographic data helped to inform partners
about disease characteristics as well as to reduce clinical trial durations. Another DFF, Muscular
Dystrophy Association, observing the lessons of Genzyme's Myozyme program for Pompeii's
disease, found that access to patients was a critical rate-limiting step that slowed clinical trials
and drove up costs. Thus they worked with patient advocacy group to help create a
comprehensive patient registry.
Supporting a Cast of Characters
Biotechs who partner with DFFs use CROs, labs, animal testing facilities, and other auxiliary
services to complete their projects. DFFs accelerated project execution by pro-actively creating
centers of excellence for supporting services. The services ranged from site initiation to clinical-
grade drug manufacturing, and depended on the stage of the DFF-funded projects. DFFs also
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educated these side players, bringing them up to speed and financing their build-outs if
necessary.4
As mentioned in the previous "Partner Sourcing" section, the Cystic Fibrosis Foundation found
that creating a short list of approved qualified vendors, CROs, clinical sites, development
experts, and other service providers expedited pre-clinical and clinical project execution.
Foundation Fighting Blindness's Preclinical Assessment Centers created Preclinical Assessment
Centers to expedite preclinical validation for companies researching potential clinical
indications.4 1 The Christopher & Dana Reeve Foundation created a central animal lab that served
academic labs, and intend on expanding these services to future commercial partners.
Access to the Best Science
Because all DFFs continued their relationship with the world's leading academic experts in their
fields, these same scientific advisors became a valuable resource for commercial partners. The
advice they provided ranged from scientific clarification to helping to design and evaluate
clinical trial data. Many DFFs, including Cystic Fibrosis Foundation, felt that many potential
partners sought them out because they had unfettered access to top scientists. Their intellectual
capital, often provided free of charge, also frequently led to further side collaborations and was
one of the most commonly cited non-cash value-added assistance provided by DFF to their
partners.
Good Housekeeping Seal of Approval
The phrase "good housekeeping seal of approval" was repeatedly uttered by almost every DFF
interviewee.40 As DFFs have limited cash to distribute, it became increasingly obvious that
leveraging their investment to attract additional capital for partners was essential. Whenever a
DFF established a partnership, their PR department would ensure that a press release was sent
out to announce the partnership. In addition, any follow-on funding, license agreement, or
acquisition would trigger another press release.
The intended audience for these announcements was often potential partners, licensors, or
acquirers. By bestowing their blessing upon a particular project, the DFF conferred a
"foundation halo". Wise DFFs and partners managed the signaling aspect of the relationship
closely to ensure that potential investors remained updated and interested. The Accelerate
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Brain Cancer Cure (ABC2) foundation, for example, traveled alongside one of their commercial
partners to actively assist in raising their $30M 2nd financing round.
Knowledge Management and Collaboration
Knowledge management and collaboration was a DFF value driver developed by frustrated DFFs
who did not understand why their academic investigator grantees were reluctant to share data
and results. DFFs now deliberately build-in collaboration and information sharing amongst all
stakeholders in their contracts." As mentioned in the previous Partner Management section,
this sets clear expectations for the commercial partner as to how the information will be
disseminated. For example, Myelin Repair Foundation and Prostate Cancer Foundation explicitly
state in their contracts that all results, positive or negative, will be shared with the DFF and
published within the year. This is a necessary pre-condition of the relationship and is not
negotiable.
DFVP officers acknowledged that the knowledge sharing amongst commercial partners did not
occur organically due to concerns about IP and trade secrets. Indeed, DFFs signed confidentiality
provisions with each company, so the DFF would often act as the central hub for sharing
observations to respect the Chinese wall between multiple commercial partners.
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Figure 4: Collaboration Model between DFF, Academic Institutions,
FDA, Patients, and Commercial Partners
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Another effective medium for multi-stakeholder collaboration was through conferences,
roundtables, and neutral forums. By convening under the banner of the DFF, the DFF can
provide air cover for academics, regulatory agencies, clinicians, and companies to interact in
real-time and share information. To paraphrase Russ Bromley of the Myelin Repair Foundation,
"Cajoling and convincing vs. command and control is how we encourage knowledge sharing".
Additionally, the MRF and JDRF expressly encouraged projects that address complex problems
that can only be addressed with interdisciplinary and multi-institutional efforts. Encouraging
team-based science41 ,42 has the side benefit of educating up and coming primary investigators in
the challenges of drug development.24 Early engagement of upstream drug discovery partners
can help the DFF to articulate how funding a basic research project may lead to a realized
therapy.
Value Drivers dependent on Partner Engagement
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The value drivers that your DFF develops will depend on the intensity of partner engagement
and education. The DFF acts a central knowledge hub; collection, vetting, disseminating
validated data and updates. It acts like an orchestra conductor who is not making music per se,
but guides different sections to harmoniously play from one music score. DFFs who provide
these non-cash value additions attracts competent partners who are eager for access to the
most current scientific thinking and projects in their disease space.
From a regulatory standpoint, DFFs like the JDRF will engage and advocate on behalf of their
commercial partners at the FDA, which is essential for more obscure, orphan diseases, regarding
relevant endpoints. It can go so far as to propose new, more relevant clinical endpoints for
trials. CROs and labs who want to establish lab expertise can look to the DFF for assistance. It is
the DFF's prerogative to be honest and unbiased, thereby inducing collaboration between
partners as a trusted intermediary. DFFs that pursue formal advocacy efforts at the FDA and
physician groups are careful not to align themselves with any particular commercial partner to
avoid potential conflicts of interest. The efforts of DFFs to educate foundation staff and
volunteer constituencies, as internal partners, about the drug discovery and development
process and risks should also be lauded.
Organization
Like the business world, the DFVP business model that any one DFF embraces is unique. There
are as many DFVP models as there are DFFs. Much of how your DFF envisions DFVP will depend
on organization-specific characteristics. These include where the funds come from, story of
origin, patient advocacy, where the science is, who runs the DFVP programs, and who you
consider to be your stakeholders.
Sources & Uses of Funds
The sources of cash will affect how your DFF transacts DFVP partnerships. The makeup of your
DFF, whether it is a family foundation with a concentrated donor pool, or a large foundation
supplemented with government money and grants, will help dictate the expectations, wishes,
and goals of the DFVP programs. What is your donor makeup? Are they educated
philanthropists?
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This will also dictate the level of detail and frequency of updates. What is the level and type of
information your donors are demanding? The 2008 and 2009 annual reports of many DFFs
contain audited financial statements without program level granularity. This is like a public
pharmaceutical company choosing to disclose how much was spent on R&D at a company level,
but not on a therapeutic level.
The Lymphoma and Leukemia's Society 2009 Annual Report contains a good example of a
concise statement that is relatable to patients and donors. Its Consolidated Statement of
Functional Expenses breaks down in detail where the money was used down to awards, grants,
travel, etc.33 The Alzheimer's Drug Discovery Foundation's 2008 pipeline report is another
example of how a DFF can examine, analyze, and publish project-specific data. 25
One question DFFs might ask themselves is whether placing DFVP centrally is attractive to
donors. For example, the Myelin Repair Foundation had found that DFVP attracts a certain class
of donors that might have never given to the MS Society, but are interested in MRF's business
model. For a foundation like the Michael J. Fox Foundation for Parkinson's Research, DFVP
resonates as they have chosen not to have an endowment. Thus, the amount they are able to
distribute is intimately tied to how much they can fundraise from new and existing donors.
In addition, DFF sometimes separate the pool of monies allocated for basic research programs
from that of translational research. Others use one pot from which all projects are funded. Still
others, like the CFF, have "unspecified" pools that fund new, out-of-cycle funding. MRF has a
separate pool for small pilot projects ($25-30k/yr) for 1 year. If these pilots pan out, then they
are fleshed out into more substantive, comprehensive project proposals. There are as many
ways to slice the aggregate pool as there are DFFs, and each DFF has a different tack of
balancing flexibility with predictability.
Story of Origin
The operation of your DFVP model depends on your story of origin. Is your DFF a stand-alone or
wholly-owned subsidiary of a parent organization? The DFVP programs that the MS Society runs
will look different from that of the Myelin Repair Foundation. The MS Society has legacy
expectations with diverse products and programs, including catering to patient groups. A de
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novo DFF like the Myelin Repair Foundation does not have legacy grant-making processes and
its accompanying expectations.
DFFs looking to create DFVP subsidiaries must carefully navigate the culture clash between the
parent and subsidiary, especially if donors want to reallocate their funds from the parent
organization to the new subsidiary. A parent foundation, like the Muscular Dystrophy
Association (MDA), might choose to launch a separate DFVP fundraising entity like the MDA
Venture Philanthropy arm. MDA maintains a legal and cultural firewall between itself & MDA
Venture Philanthropy to deliberately cultivate a different, more risk-embracing culture at MDA
Venture Philanthropy.
Where is the Science At?
The current level of scientific understanding of your disease will affect grant allocation in the
drug development process. If the underlying biology of the disease pathologies and progression
remains unclear and uncertain, with few or ineffective tools, then the primary focus of the DFF
will logically remain at basic scientific stage, with few forays into translational activities. The DFF
usually works with the NIH at this point to try to bring more attention and dollars to their
particular cause, and strategically allocates DFF funds to complement NIH funds. Because the
scientific risk is highest at this point, deciding which projects to move forward into target
validation can be a moving target.
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Figure 5: DFVP Approach Mapped on Science/Medicine Question vs.
Complexity of Solution
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A 2x2 matrix can help delineate the main thrust of any DFF program. On the x-axis, is your DFF
tackling a science or medicine question? That is, is your DFF trying to figure out what the
question is, or do you have a pretty decent grasp on the question so you're likely to come up
with viable solutions? The y-axis addresses the complexity of the potential solutions. Solution
complexity, of course, is part and parcel of problem definition. If the problem is relatively
straightforward, the DFF can be relentlessly focused on a few potential therapies.
If the problem is multi-factorial, or if the disease focus spans multiple pathologies and etiologies,
then a more a diversified approach is called for. This requires the foundation to be brutally frank
about the current scientific state of affairs. Self-review should be performed yearly to ensure
correct triangulation of where the DFF can be most effective in its grant allocation process. This
can be clearly reflected in the DFF's mission statement. Are you looking for a cure? A disease-
modifying therapy? These are two related but different goals. Are the questions you are seeking
to clarify ones that the DFF can help answer? Is it the problem a well-defined one, and is there a
clear action plan?42 Are you aiming for a cure or a care? Is this a moving target?
Scientific risk was felt to be the most unpredictable and unmanageable risk in disease
philanthropy. Variations on "science is a random walk, hard, and messy" echoed from every
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DFVP officer interviewed. Mitigating this risk was felt to be amongst the most challenging issues
that a DFVP program faced.
As Russ Bromley of the Myelin Repair Foundation said, "we focus on tractable problems and
workable solutions." The MRF broke down its mission statement into discrete, quantifiable goals
with "expiration dates" that held itself publically accountable. For example, they had set forth a
target of identifying myelin repair drug targets by the end of 2009, and getting the 1s drug into
Phase I trials by 2014.41 FasterCures also identified that well-defined problems with a clear path
to an attainable goal(s) was essential for successful collaborations.4 1
Patients
There were varying levels of patient involvement in the DFFs surveyed. Few had little to no
direct patient interaction. Others had patient representation at a board or review committee
level. For all levels of patient engagement, managing patient expectations was key. The balance
between driving excitement and dollars towards funding projects and remaining dispassionate
as a neutral clearinghouse was one that each DFF dealt with in its own way. If patients were part
of the DFVP decision-making process, it was felt that they provided best input regarding
potential clinical impact. One such program was the Faster Cure's Patients Helping Doctors
(PHD) initiative that sought to empower "patients to be part of the research enterprise".
HR
DFFs that sought to utilize DFVP to diversify beyond their traditional grant-making models also
found themselves managing tensions within their internal organization. Whether applying DFVP
narrowly or on a foundation level, many of the common problems that cropped up are listed
below.
* Control/territorial issues between foundation staff and donors - who has decision-
making authority
* Culture clash between business world and non-profit world, suspicion, mistrust 7
* Lack of financial savvy to conduct due diligence and transact deals
* Divide between the employees who are sourcing deals and the rest of organization
* Financial resources at disposal (short-term and long-term)
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* Perception of cannibalizing fundraising monies from parent organization
" Grant allocation between basic research, translational research, and clinical studies
" Different risk appetites
* Effect of recency bias, recent financial collapse of fall 2008 and public flogging of
financial institutions & corporate greed. Touted "business" principles tainted by
financial debacle. High anti-corporate sentiment among public.'9
Historically, DFF staffs were career non-profit employees who had PhD's with relevant scientific
expertise. The old paradigm was one of a black box, where donations were taken in as inputs
and grants were distributed as outputs. The new, current paradigm demands foundation staff
with financial acumen in addition to scientific research experience. The new generation of
philanthropists wants more control and transparency into resource allocation decisions. DFVP
directors must mirror this attitude. Most of these new donors have created wealth through
hands-on entrepreneurial ventures, and fervently subscribe to infusing and transplanting
successful business practices into the DFF world. Those who give generously often expect a
measure of input, such as sitting in on business advisory discussions of potential partners. Other
donors who are frustrated with the slow progress of disease research agitate to bring lean
improvement projects to DFF-funded programs.
The backgrounds of the staff running the DFVP programs were a mix of academia and industry.
The best "blend" came from scientists who had done research in that particular therapeutic
area, moved into industry to run R&D, then ran Business Development functions at both small
and large life science companies. Much of setting up a successful DFVP program required
knowledge of how commercial partners made money and understanding their capital and
incentive structures. Thus, the relative industry savvy of these directors shaped how the DFVP
programs planned for failures and assessed risk. Furthermore, the business acumen of these
DFVP directors dictated the sophistication of financial instruments of a potential deal. Most of
the due diligence was outsourced with guidance from the DFF, and a DFVP director with
business experience would know hot button issues for further assessment.
Stakeholder Analysis
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A final self-reflection exercise might be one of stakeholder analysis. List all parties that might
have an interest in your DFF. These could include small donors, large donors, volunteers,
foundation staff, foundation board, academic scientists, clinician-scientists, clinicians, patients,
patient's families, biotech companies, large pharma, regulatory agencies, CROs, etc.
Next, try to clarify who is your primary customer? That is, who are you trying to please above
everyone else? Then, identify your partners, consultants, and suppliers. Partners are entities
that you need to help serve your customers. Consultants are entities that provide services and
perform non-core functions, and your suppliers provide key inputs. Finally, who are your
shareholders? Who has a vested interest in making sure your DFF achieves its goals? Who has
the most to gain?
Answering the Venture Philanthropy Skeptics
Venture philanthropy has always has its healthy share of skeptics. They claim that venture
philanthropy is another trendy term coined by buzzword-happy consultants.19 At its worst,
venture philanthropy has been accused of painting a pro-business veneer on the organization.
Critics have decried giving "non-profit organization(s) an extreme commercial makeover", often
to the detriment of foundation staff. However, it is wise to put the impact of DFVP in
perspective. The government is still the largest "foundation" that distributes funds. Its resources
dwarf that of DFFs. The lay public continues to expect that the government will allocate
resources to maximize public welfare.
It is clear that there is no magic formula of entrepreneurial practices linked to social outcomes
for DFFs who are thoughtfully engaged in DFVP. The DFF community is mostly aligned with
DFVP, and whether one calls it "venture philanthropy", "strategic grant-making", or
"measurable giving", the kernel of venture philanthropy has existed for decades. The difficulties
that DFFs face is in the execution, and embracing change management that goes far beyond
appointing a Vice-President of Venture Philanthropy.
Moreover, there is sense of urgency that DFFs can communicate through their DFVP efforts to
their stakeholders. Donors, many of whom are savvy technology users, want to see tangible
results from their contributions and sophisticated use of technology. For many of these
diseases, there is a clear unmet clinical need and patients are dying. Clinicians are frustrated
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with their lack of therapeutic options. Academic scientists are excited to see their research
translated and are rapidly learning about commercialization challenges. Foundation staff are
looking to business thought leaders and DFFs that have paved the way. Boards of directors have
read about venture philanthropy and social entrepreneurship and are eager to adopt
innovation, or at least give the perception of doing so. Large pharmaceuticals wait to see if DFVP
can de-risk programs enough for them to want to invest, license, or partner. Regulatory agencies
receive continuing education from DFFs as to the latest science advances. VC-backed life science
companies need money for the unsexy translational activities and pre-clinical validation.
Final Thoughts
In the past, scientific advances that have led to blockbuster therapies were thought to be "low-
hanging" fruit, as single-cause diseases were tackled with relatively straightforward small
molecule solutions21". Multi-factorial diseases with environmental, epigenetic, and genetic
factors like most cancers and immunological pathologies are currently forefront in R&D
pipelines today. As their level of complexity increases, the required level of collaboration
between different academic and scientific disciplines increases as well.24 This neatly explains
how disease focused foundations as "neutral open forums" are pivotal in cogently expanding
the body of knowledge and moving therapy development forward in an interdisciplinary way.
To paraphrase Dr. Simons of PCF, the key value driver for DFFs is the "sense and authenticity of
urgency" that DFFs can communicate from their "bully pulpit". Dr. Louis DeGennaro from LLS
echoed Dr. Simon's sentiments that LLS was well-placed to inject sense of "urgency to the
situation", and could crisply crystallize the frustrations that donors and patients feel with the
lack of available disease-modifying therapies as a function of DFF funding.
Disease focused foundations occupy a rare and privileged "trusted place for progress in society".
There are few organizations in society that the lay public implicitly trusts. Thus, fundamental to
a DFF identity is that of an "honest mediator" that "transparently" wields the "power to
convene" to solve market failures in the drug development process. A DFF has extremely limited
resources relative to its for-profit counterparts. But if your foundation sets itself up as the
neutral "exchange of scientific and medical knowledge", it may have more power to fund bring
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crucial therapies to market by funding transformative, translational research with clinical
relevance than any other institution today.42
Further Questions to Explore
Are there therapeutic areas that lend itself more to DFVP investments? Orphan diseases, any
disease with a captive patient population, high mortality rates with few clinically effective
therapies may fall into this category. Additionally, any aging or neurodegenerative disease that
disproportionally affects baby boomers might be ideal, as high-net worth donors are most likely
to be afflicted with these diseases. Others identified include reproductive and international
health.9 The flip side of this question is: Are there foundations that should not enter the DFVP
space? For example, the American Cancer Society had proposed an in-house venture
philanthropy arm, but decided for unclear reasons to pull back. Not all DFFs may be suited to
strategically de-risking pre-clinical assets with commercial partners.
Another area of future research is the dearth of highly functional markets and capital flow in
biomedical disease research.41This creates inefficiencies, information asymmetries, and high
transaction costs for both the DFF and their potential partners.
A related line of inquiry would be a proposal for a standardized informed report card for DFFs. If
one thinks about public companies, and the metrics that are most commonly used such as
earnings per share, net income, return on assets, etc, a philanthropist seeking to make
donations needs comparable data on returns across DFFs so as to better identify top performing
organizations. For this to occur, trend data from all DFFs would need to be made public. This
data would need to be distilled into 4-6 key DFF/DFVP metrics to determine the overall growth
and trajectory of the DFF. These could be shared with the Board of Directors and key donors.
They should be useful and concise enough that all stakeholders could recite them from memory.
Controls would need to be identified to test the fundamental assertion that DFVP accelerates
development of a cure.
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Appendix A- Brief Overview of DFFs
1) Alzheimer's Drug Discovery Foundation (ADDF) / Institute for Aging21 ,25
a) ADDF's hybrid investment vehicle called Fund for Alzheimer's Drug Discovery21
b) In 2008, 9 of the 70 AD drug programs in current clinical trials received some support
from ADDF
c) Between 1998 to 2006, total of $28M was disbursed; 137 academic and 19 industry
projects for 116 unique PI's: 112 drug discovery (69%), 21 clinical stage (16% of funds),
15 early detection (biomarkers, testing, imaging), 8 preventing/risk reduction.
d) From 1998 to 2006, $22M invested in 94 drug discovery research programs in 12
countries, 38 (40%) advanced forward at least 2 key milestones in drug development
process), 13 advanced 1 stage
i) Drug development stages defined chronologically as: target discovery, target
validation, lead discovery, lead validation, lead optimization, proof-of-concept, pre-
clinical development, clinical trials. Proof-of-concept studies represented 30% of
portfolio
ii) Categories: Neuroprotection, animal models, anti-amyloid, anti-inflammatory,
antioxidants, anti-tangles, cognitive enhancers
iii) Smallest grant: $25k
iv) Largest grant: $1.15M
e) Performance metrics for success:
i) Ratio of scientific progress as measured by movement through stages through drug
discovery and development divide by dollar invested. Higher numbers indicate more
progress per dollar spent or better project selection
ii) IP creation: 50 (56%) new IP secured from 94 programs, 16 (17%) of these have
been licensed
2) Christopher & Dana Reeve Foundation 39
a) Four different funding mechanisms
i) Investigator initiated individual grants (focus on rehabilitation therapies as sub
category)
ii) International Research Consortium (8 labs globally collaborating)
(1) Core Labs (animal lab that is run by investigators in the fellows program)
iii) North American Clinical Trial Networks (NACTN)
(1) Started 6 years ago
(2) Fully funded by DoD (Walter Reed Hospital)
iv) Neuro Recovery Network (NRN) - activity-based rehabilitation
3) Cystic Fibrosis Foundation15 ,30, 36
a) Therapeutics Development Program established in 1998
b) Cystic Fibrosis Foundation Therapeutics (CFFT) established in 2000 as non-profit drug
discovery and affiliate of CFF
c) Can invest up to $25M (total) in DFVP efforts
d) 8 areas of focus & research w/ 25 commercial partners
i) Gene therapy: Copernicus Therapeutics
ii) CTFR modulation: Vertex Pharmaceuticals, PTC Therapeutics
iii) Restore airway surface liquid: Inspire Pharma, Pharmaxis, Sucampo
Pharmaceuticals, Lantibio, Gilead Sciences
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iv) Mucus alteration: Genentech
v) Anti-inflammatory: BioAdvantex, GlaxoSmithKline
vi) Anti-infective: Novartis Pharmaceuticals, Pfizer, Gilead Sciences, Transave, Kalobios
Pharmaceuticals, Mpex Pharmaceuticals, Bayer Schering Pharma
vii) Transplantation: APT Pharmaceuticals
viii) Nutrition: Yasoo Health, Axcan Scandipharm, DCI, Eurand Pharmaceuticals, McNeil,
Solvay Pharmaceuticals, Alnara Pharma
ix) 2 workout situations in past year: e.g. Altus Pharmaceuticals (case of cash-strapped
biotech that discontinued program), CFF had to come in to take the IP, and sub-
license TrizytekTM to Alnara Pharma
4) Epilepsy Therapy Project 28
a) 2 grant programs: New Therapy Grants Program, Commercialization Grants
b) 33 grants to scientists & entrepreneurs to move toward commercialization of lab
concepts
c) 1 matching grant to increase interest in licensing a potentially safer version of an
existing treatment
d) 3 seed-stage investments to support start-up companies
i) Nov 2009, partnership with NeuroTherapeutics Pharma (investment)
ii) Dec 2008, partnership with IntelliVision Technologies, Corp (grant)
iii) Dec 2007, partnership with Neuromed Pharmaceuticals (grant)
iv) Dec 2007, partnership with Neurologix, Inc. (grant)
v) May 2006, partnership with Unv of Wisconsin and NeuroGenomX (equity
investment)
vi) April 2005, partnership with VistaGen Therapeutics, Inc. (investment)
vii) April 2004, partnership with Marinus Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (investment)
viii) March 2004, partnership with NeuroMolecular Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (investment)
5) Foundation Fighting Blindness38
a) 2 grant programs: New Therapy Grants Program, Commercialization Grants
b) National NeuroVision Research Institute (NNRI) - relatively new division of FFB
i) Clinical arm of FFB
ii) Four areas:
(1) Genetic Therapy
(2) Nutritional Pipeline
(3) Neuroprotective
(4) Cellular Therapy
6) Juvenile Diabetes Research Foundation (JDRF)27 ,29
a) JDRF Industry Discovery & Development Partnerships (IDDP) Program
b) IDDP Therapeutic Pipeline - 20 programs with 20 partners
c) 33 deals to date, only 1 equity-based deal with TolerX (3.5M of a 34M financing round
on same deal terms as VC's and other institutional investors)
d) $1.4B to date, started IDDP 5-6 years ago
7) The Leukemia & Lymphoma Society33
a) 60 year history (longest amongst DFFs profiled)
b) Therapy Acceleration Program (TAP) launched in 2008 - Partnering w/ biotech
companies - Split into 3 prongs
i) Academic Concierge Division - Liaison between academic researchers and CROs for
pre-clinical validation in preparation for FDA clinical trial application (60 projects as
of Apr. 2010)
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ii) Biotechnology Accelerator Division - Partners with biotech and pharmaceutical
companies on gaining clinical efficacy
iii) Clinical Trial Division - Coordinates with cancer trial centers and patient registries to
increase patient enrollment for Phase I and 11 trials
c) Biotech partners include: Aegera (Phase 1/11), Memgen (Phase lb), Celator
Pharmaceuticals (Phase lIb),
8) Michael J. Fox Foundation for Parkinson's Research17
a) Founded in 2000; $175M+ over past 10 years
b) Highest private funder in Parkinson's disease research space
c) Business model = no endowment
i) Therapeutic Development Initiative (TDI) ~$5M/year (industry-exclusive) for pre-
clinical PD research
ii) Rapid Response Innovation Awards - high-risk, high-reward projects with little to
no existing preliminary data, but potential to significantly impact our understanding
or treatment of PD
iii) Target Validation Awards - PD-relevant pre-clinical model development
iv) Clinical Intervention Awards - clinical testing of promising PD therapies
d) LEAPS (Linked Efforts to Accelerate Parkinson's Solutions) 41
i) Proof of Concept to Phase I clinical trials
ii) Multi-million dollar, multi-year grants w/ industry and academic components
9) Multiple Myeloma Research Foundation3 1
a) $13.8M in research program grants in 2008, $14.2M in 2007
b) $115M raised for multiple myeloma R&D development since inception
c) $14M invested in research programs since inception
d) MMRF Fund - Pre-clinical validation
e) Biotech Investment Awards - Expand validation and early clinical trials
i) Aileron Therapeutics in 2008
ii) Astex Therapeutics in 2008
f) Multiple Myeloma Research Consortium - Human clinical trials
10) Myelin Repair Foundation24
a) Accelerated Research Collaboration (ARC) "outcome-driven model"24
b) Founded 2003/2004
c) Projected $80M grant budget between 2010-2015 (3x as previous 3 yrs)
d) 40 projects funded between 2003-2010, 18 patentable inventions, 24 research tools, 19
myelin repair targets identified
e) Based on open-source, early stage academic collaboration: project design engages
multiple labs; outcome-driven research projects; "Acceleration through Collaboration"
i) IP framework: MRF files for patents, university that generated the idea keeps the IP,
MRF markets IP to potential industry partners24
ii) Currently 25-30 investigator-initiated projects, each project has 12-month
deliverables, 2nd year funding predicated on hitting milestones
f) Approached 40 potential biopharma partners, 6 identified as good. Most industry not as
well versed in myelin repair and validation.
11) Prostate Cancer Foundation3 1
a) $28M committed towards new research projects in 2008
b) Multiple grant programs:
i) PCF Creativity Awards: $50-100k to investigators, 1 yr w/ option for follow-on
funding
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ii) PCF Challenge Awards: $300k-$1M/yr to at least 3 investigators on 3 year project
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